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COMMENTS
Civil Code Article 2324: A Broken Path to Limited
Solidary Liability
Norman Normal decided to travel the countryside by automobile.
Pete Pitiful, a speeding motorist along the same route, failed to main-
tain control of his car and rammed into Norman. The collision ruptured
Norman's fuel tank due to a manufacturing defect, causing an explosion
and fire. Norman received substantial burns resulting in grotesque scars,
particularly on his face. Unable to compromise the claim, the parties
tried the matter before a jury, which assessed $1,000,000 in damages.
The jury assigned sixty percent fault to Pete and forty percent fault
to Manufacturer. Pete's only asset was a $10,000 automobile liability
policy.
Under the law as it existed prior to September 1, 1987, the legal
result was clear: because Pete and Manufacturer were solidary obligors,
each liable for the whole, Manufacturer owed Norman $1,000,000 less
Pete's insurance coverage. In the name of tort reform, the Louisiana
Legislature eliminated this certainty and possibly changed the liability
of solidary obligors such as Manufacturer by amending Civil Code
article 2324.1
This article will explore the potential interpretations, shortcomings,
and virtues of article 2324(B). 2 The first section offers a plausible
Copyright 1989, by LouISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 1987 La. Acts No. 373, § 1, effective September 1, 1987.
2. Problems associated with section (A), such as the meaning of "intentional or
willful," whether the amendment encompasses more than delictual solidarity and the
temporal effect of the legislation are beyond the scope of this Comment.
The meaning of "willful act" in section (A) causes concern. "Willful" could include
any action beyond rudimentary involuntary reactions. The defense bar may attempt to
import the criminal law meaning of "willful" to restrict the application of Section A.
The historical underpinnings of providing an accused with additional safeguards against
conviction should not be utilized in tort litigation. The judiciary is well advised to avoid
such a pitfall inasmuch as criminal law policy is inapposite to tort law. For an excellent
discussion of the various terms connoting action lying on the continuum between intentional
and negligence, see Comment, Reflections on Willful, Wanton, Reckless, and Gross
Negligence, 48 La. L. Rev. 1383 (1988). But see W. Burdick, Principles of Roman Law
and Their Relation to Modern Law 414-17 (1938); J. Goudsmit, The Pandects § 76, at
213 (De Tracy Gould (1938) trans. 1873). The problem with degrees of fault or culpability
has existed for centuries. Roman jurists dealt with various degrees of fault-lata, lation,
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explanation of the legislation. The next section explores the history of
solidary liability and contribution. Discussion of three phrases that
afford the judiciary great latitude in the interpretation of article 2324
follows in the third section. Next, the ambiguity produced by the new
statute in multiparty situations is explored. Finally, proposals for other
equitable resolutions of the conflicting policies are asserted, and a brief
explanation of the 1988 amendment 3 to article 2324, which purports
to correct a prescription problem caused by the 1987 legislation, is
given.
THE LEGISLATION IN GENERAL
Act 373, which amended article 2324, states:
To amend and reenact Civil Code Article 2324, relative to
offenses and quasi offenses, to provide for joint, divisible
liability, to provide for solidary liability, and to provide for
related matters.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
Section 1. Civil Code Article 2324 is hereby amended and
reenacted to read as follows:
latissma, magna, gravior, levis, and levisima.
Arguably the phrase "person suffering injury" in article 2324(B) includes contractual
damages. Many times it is difficult to distinguish tort from contract damages as in the
negligent breach of a contract. In Champion v. Panel Era Manufacuring Co., 410 So.
2d 1230 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 414 So. 2d 389 (1982) the court stated:
In any case involving an obligation, liability must result from a breach of duty,
whether the duty arises out of the undertakings of the parties, from their
voluntary acts, by operation of law or otherwise. It is entirely possible that the
same duty might have more than one source, as in the case of the negligent
breach of a contractual obligation, in which case a cause of action arises from
both the breach and the negligence. One set of circumstances might produce
multiple duties arising from multiple sources.
410 So. 2d at 1236.
In all likelihood, the courts will treat the legislation prospectively; a possibility alluded
to in Eskine v. Regional Transit Authority, 531 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1988). The' court noted that the plaintiff's cause of action arose prior to the 1987
amendment and applied the former law. Accord Adamson v. City of Lafayette, 521 So.
2d 1258, 1261 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 798 (1988). But failure to
argue that issue would produce the same result. The Fourth Circuit recently ruled that
the amendment applies prospectively only in Morrison v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 537 So.
2d 360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
3. 1988 La. Acts No. 430. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(C) states:
Interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor, whether the obligation
is considered joint and divisible or solidary, is effective against all joint tort-
feasors. Nothing in this Subsection shall be construed to affect in any manner
the application of the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.41 (G).
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Art. 2324. Liability as solidary or joint and divisible ob-
ligation
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an
intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that
person, for the damage caused by such act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, or
as otherwise provided by law, then liability for damages caused
by two or more persons shall be solidary only to the extent
necessary for the person suffering injury, death, or loss to
recover fifty percent of his recoverable damages; however, when
the amount of recovery has been reduced in accordance with
the preceding Article, a judgment debtor shall not be liable
for more than the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor
to whom a greater degree of fault has been attributed. Under
the provisions of this Article, all parties shall enjoy their re-
spective rights of indemnity and contribution. Except as de-
scribed in Paragraph A of this Article, or as otherwise provided
by law, and hereinabove, the liability for damages caused by
two or more persons shall be a joint, divisible obligation, and
a joint tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable with any other
person for damages attributable to the fault of such other
person, including the person suffering injury, death, or loss,
regardless of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay,
degree of fault, or immunity by statute or otherwise.
The original bill, introduced in the House of Representatives, 4
eliminated solidary liability among joint tortfeasors.5 Subsequent re-
4. House Bill 841, as originally proposed, stated:
To amend and reenact Civil Code Articles 2323 and 2324, relative to offenses
and quasi offenses, to provide for computation of and liability for damages,
to provide for joint and divisible liability, to provide for solidary liability, and
to provide for related matters.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:
Section 1. Civil Code Article 2323 and 2324 are hereby amended and
reenacted to read as follows:
Art. 2323.
Art. 2324. Liability solidary or joint and divisible obligation
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or
willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused
by such act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability for
damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint, divisible obligation.
A joint tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable with any other person for damages
attributable to the fault of such other person, including the person suffering
19891 1353
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vision limited the change and provided that certain tortfeasors will
remain solidarily liable "to the extent necessary for the person ...
to recover fifty percent of his recoverable damages." 6 Otherwise, "the
liability [of two or more persons] for damages . . . shall be a joint,
divisible obligation." ' Consistent with prior law, the legislation limited
a tortfeasor's liability to his degree of fault provided "a greater degree
of fault [is] attributed" 8 to the victim.
Consider, for example, 9 a judgment of $100,000 in favor of plaintiff






Prior to the 1987 legislation, A or B would have owed one hundred
percent of the damages in the event the other could not pay. But since
amended article 2324 purports to limit solidary liability to fifty percent
of recoverable damages, P now seems to recover only $50,000 from
A if B is insolvent or otherwise unavailable for payment. If A is
insolvent, then B seems to owe only eighty percent, because P will
have "recover[ed] fifty percent of his recoverable damages." 10 B's
obligation above fifty percent would be joint and divisible. Consistent
with the previous law, if P was contributorily negligent for a greater
degree of fault than A, then A owes P its virile share of $20,000.11
Clearly worded legislation could have precisely defined these results;
this Comment would then possess the virtue of brevity. Unfortunately,
injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other person's insolvency, ability to
pay, degree of fault, or immunity by statute or otherwise.
The engrossed verson of House Bill No. 841 contains an amendment to article 2324 only.
5. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A) maintained the intentional and willful conspiracy
exception.
6. As amended by the House Committee on Civil Law; later enacted as La. Civ.
Code art. 2324(B).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B). This limitation represents a continuation of the 1979
amendment. 1979 La. Acts No. 431, § 1, effective Aug. 1, 1980.
9. The hypothetical may create the impression that article 2324 provides a readily
ascertainable outcome. That is an unwarranted proposition. This example is merely a
means of facilitating analysis of the problems with the amendment.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
1l. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
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the legislature failed on this account, leaving the judiciary with the
task of ferreting out a plausible interpretation. Inasmuch as delictual
solidary liability is a creature of supreme court jurisprudence,' 2 the
courts should analyze the basic policies at stake, striking a balance
between the interests of the victims and of defendants. Such a reas-
sessment could avoid an unrestricted overruling of solidarity as it
presently exists where there is no clear legislative indication to that
effect.
The Basic Principles of Solidarity
The civilian concept of in solido liability in tort is analogous to
common law joint and several liability.' 3 Each tortfeasor was liable
for all the victim's damages.' 4 This provided identical results for either
system-a "deep pocket" defendant paid the tab for another insolvent,
undeterminable" or hidden' 6 tortfeasor.
12. See Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980), Sampay v. Morton Salt Co.,
395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981), Hoefly v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575
(La. 1982), Narcise v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 427 So. 2d 1192 (La. 1983).
13. "It is our understanding that a liability in solido and a joint and several liability
is (sic) one and the same thing ... " Garland v. Coreil, 17 La. App. 17, 18, 134 So.
297, 297 (1931); see also Johnson v. Jones-Journet, 320 So. 2d 533, 536 (La. 1975); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Soileau, 323 So. 2d 221, 225 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Davis v.
Newpark Shipbuilding and Repair, Inc. 659 F.Supp. 155, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); W. Howe,
Studies in the Civil Law and Its Relations to the Jurisprudence of England and America
246 (2nd ed. 1905). In Louisiana, other effects of solidary liability are significant. Suit
against a solidary obligor interrupts prescription as to all other solidary obligors, proper
venue as to one solidary obligor provides proper venue as to all and payment by one
solidary obligor relieves all other solidary obligors. La. Civ. Code arts 1794, 1799, 3503;
La. Code Civ. P. art. 73.
These effects may have caused the court to stretch principles of solidarity to cases
where prescription lapsed or venue was improper but for the solidary obligations of the
defendants. For example in Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979)
the supreme court held that a forklift repair company was "potentially a solidary obligor"
with officers and supervisory personnel of the plaintiff's employer thus extending the
prescriptive period for the former to assert a contribution claim against the latter. Id. at
378. See also Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980) (prescription); Hoefly v.
Government Employees Inc. Co., 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982) (prescription); Reeves v.
Dixie Brick, Inc., 403 So. 2d 792, 795 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (where a brick mason
and brick manufacturer were solidary obligors for purposes of venue).
14. "'Joint tort-feasor' is one of those unhappy phrases of indeterminate meaning,
whose repetition has done so much to befog the law. Nobody knows what exactly is a
joint tort ... [J]oint tort-feasor means radically different things to different courts, and
often to the same court; that much of the existing confusion is due to an entire failure
to distinguish the different senses in which the term is used. ... Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 413, 413 (1937).
15. The class action suits stemming from exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES) best
exemplify indeterminable defendants. The plaintiffs sought damages resulting from the
19891
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The underlying policies of solidary liability include victim com-
pensation, loss allocation' 7 and risk management. By definition each
tortfeasor's actions must be the legal cause of the injury; solidary
liability makes each liable for the entire damage sustained up to the
victim's full monetary recovery.
The courts, in adopting solidary liability, espoused a theory that
it is better to allocate damages to the injurers, even in greater portions
than their respective degrees of fault, than have victims suffer a reduced
recovery.' 8 This is so even when the solvent tortfeasor is only marginally
at fault. Having produced some portion of the loss, a tortfeasor had
no room to complain when bearing losses also caused by another
injurer; society thereby assured the victim of complete recovery if any
one tortfeasor possessed sufficient wealth.
Imposing solidary liability on actors provided an impetus to reduce
potentially harmful risk creating conditions. Faced with a substantial
loss, even if only minimally at fault, businesses should spend greater
resources, such as increasing supervision and training, to prevent the
injuries. Moreover, public bodies will better maintain streets and in-
surance companies will more closely supervise their insureds' business
activities when faced with substantial liability for augmenting an injury
causing situation. Society ideally could maximize the standard of living
by placing incentives on those most able to prevent the losses.
As with most policy decisions related to risk management, asset
allocation and tort law, empirical evidence to support or refute solidary
prenatal exposure to DES. In Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869, 42 L.Ed. 2d 107, 95 S.Ct.
127 (1980), the California Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court's summary dismissal
based upon plaintiff's inability to identity the manufacturer responsible for her injuries,
held that each manufactuer owed a portion of the damage in relation to its share of the
market at the time of the exposure to the drug notwithstanding a lack of evidence to
implicate any particular manufacturer's negligence. Each defendant could exculpate itself
by "demonstrat[ing] that it could not have made the product which caused the injury."
26 Cal. 3d at 612, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937: See also Bichler v. Ely Lilly
& Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (where in similar
circumstances, the DES manufacturer was jointly' and severally liable). But see Bartlett
v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (App. 1982), cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982) (where the court assessed an unknown driver's
negligence and reduced the victim's recovery accordingly.)
16. See generally 25 Am. Jur. Trials Hidden and Mulitiple Defendant Tort Litigation
(1978).
17. Hall, Tort Law in American History xiii (1987) ("Nineteenth century tort law
operated on the assumption that some injuries would go uncompensated... In the twentieth
century... the emphasis shifted [placing] greater accountability on enterprise (sic) for the
unavoidable costs of industrialization.").
18. But see Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An
Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 La. L. Rev. 343, 362 n.80 (1980) (where the author
argues this is a "single-minded" approach concerned only with victim compensation.)
1356 [Vol. 49
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liability policies is equivocal. 9 It appears some legislators are unper-
suaded whether this method of risk prevention effectively allocates
resources. In fact, supporting that doubt, some legal scholars argue
injurers never consider post-accident risks and liabilities before they
act.20
Balanced against these policies is the "deep pocket" defendants'
cry for relief.2' Those with substantial financial wealth, such as the
state, its political subdivisions and insurance companies, bear the brunt
of these costs. Victims sue these parties with the expectation that the
jury will find them at least minimally at fault. Since the one percent
defendant was a "solidary obligor and liable for the entire damage
award, 22 the victim's full recovery is virtually assured. So goes the
quandary-victims claim entitlement to the protections afforded by
solidarity, and deep pocket defendants assert this doctrine jeopardizes
their financial well-being. 23
Much uncertainty surrounds the purported purpose of article 2324's
amendment. Whether "deep pocket" verdicts precipitated a significant
portion of the insurance industry's problems is a subject of much
debate. 24 In contrast, a growing number believe that several large
insurance companies created the insurance crisis to justify raising prem-
19. Compare Steinberg, The Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability is Properly
Concerned with the Rights of Victims Rather than the Economic Well-Being of Wrongdoers,
9:3 L.A. Lawyer 35 (May 1986) with Elimination of Joint Liability for Noneconomic
Damages Will Help Make our Tort Adversary System Well Again, 9:3 L.A. Lawyer 34
(May 1986) (for the typical thesis of the opposing arguments).
20. See generally, Landes and Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic
Analysis, 9 J. Legal St. 517 (1980).
21. See also Bottorff, City Suit Figures Show L.A. Liability Tripled Since 1980, The
L.A. Daily J., Apr. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 6, (where less than unbiased statistics show the
escalation in costs for a "Deep Pocket" defendant.)
22. A one percent case recently received notoriety. Wood v. Walt Disney World Co.,
515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987). The possiblity of a 1 percent defendant as a solidary obligor
is admittedly remote even under the old law. The victim must be 1 percent or totally
without fault; otherwise the victim possesses a "greater degree of fault" than that tortfeasor
and the tortfeasor owes damages attributible to his own fault only. La. Civ. Code art.
2324(B) (1974) & (1987).
23. For an even handed discussion of the liability crisis see An Update on the Liability
Crisis: Tort Policy Working Group, 10:2 Am. J. Trial Adv. 213 (1986).
24. See Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith and Simon, Sources of the Crisis in Liability
Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 367 (1988) (where the authors state
that some perceive the "eased requirements for establishing joint and several liability" as
a cause for the insurance crisis and opine that, absent "continued expansion . . . of tort
liability," "[clontinued worsening of the[] crisis characteristics is not assured." Id. at 389
& 395. See generally Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 367-516
(1988) for other related articles; See also Mooney, The Liability Crisis-A Perspective,
32 Vill. L. Rev. 1235, 1241-51 (1987); Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance
Claims Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 909 (1988).
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iums while simultaneously reducing coverage. 25 Forestalling an indi-
cation whether relief from solidarity might reduce insured's claims and
losses, the Senate rejected an amendment creating a. thirty-six month
trial period, whereby article 2324 reverted to the 1979 language if
"liability insurance premiums" failed to fall "five percent per year
for the next three years." ' 26 In light of the amendment's nonexistent
legislative history and the ubiquitous "insurance crisis" it is difficult
to ascertain what the legislature intended-whether the new article
overrules the solidary liability espoused in the text of Louisiana Civil
Code article 1794 and the judicial glosses interpreting it.
THE HISTORY OF SOLIDARY LIABILITY
Apparently since the beginning of recorded legal history, solidary
liability and contribution provided the legal bases for much litigation
among victims and multiple tortfeasors. The development of solidarity
has been accompanied by a certain degree of conceptual confusion in
all legal systems, including that of Louisiana. Many times these con-
ceptual errors led to an unnecessary expansion of solidary liability.
Exploring the evolution of solidarity in various legal systems helps
illuminate the current state of tort solidarity in Louisiana.
Classical Roman Law and Justinian
Solidarity liability for contracts and delictual conduct had its genesis
in ancient Rome. The Roman jurists, during the classical period, drew
a distinction between correal and solidary obligations;27 a tort com-
mitted by more than one actor created the latter. Tort damages were
considered the equivalent of penalties, and the victim was permitted
25. Twenty state attorneys general recently sued these insurance companies in state
and federal courts. See Resky, Was There a Liability Crisis?, A.B.A.J., Jan., 1989, at
46.
26. Senator Jumonville's amendment on June 16, 1987 stated:
It is the intent of the Louisiana Legislature that the passage of this Act result
in the reduction of liability insurance premiums by at least five percent per year
for the next three years. If at the end of thirty-six months from the effective
date of this Act, liability insurance premiums have not been reduced by at least
fifteen percent of the premium level in existence on April 1 Code Article 2324
as amended by this Act shall revert to the language contained therein prior to
the passage of this Act.
27. Generally created by stipulation only, correality centered around contractual re-
lations and therefore of no moment in a delictual setting. See W. Buckland, A Textbook
of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 453 (2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter Buckland]; R.
Sohm, The Institutes of Roman Law § 74, at 383-85 (2d ed. 1901) [hereinafter Sohm];
see generally J. Wylie, Solidarity and Correality (1923) [hereinafter Wylie].
1358 [Vol. 49
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to recover one hundred percent of the damages from each of the
tortfeasors.
Classical law forbade contribution, 2 even when coinjurers were
present and solvent.2 9 The praetor allowed a victim the option to pursue
the claims against any tortfeasor and in any proportion.30 This policy
inevitably lead to collusion between the victim and one or more of
the tortfeasors. Injurers, for example, sometimes offered bribes to the
victim, hoping to influence his decision to sue the other tortfeasors. 3'
Justinian altered the classical theory of solidarity. The law of
Justinian, particularly the Digest, allowed a slave owner one hundred
percent recovery from each person causing the death of the slave;
otherwise, the law permitted only a single recovery of damages. Ad-
ditionally, in accordance with lex Aquilia,3 2 payment by one of the
wrongdoers did not release the others.33
Scholars agree that the grant of beneficium divisionis3 4 contribution
belongs to Justinian." Aside from the continuation of classical soli-
darity principles when parties killed a slave, Justinian ameliorated the
no contribution doctrine.36 In the case of praetorian delicts37 and quasi-
delicts" the law evolved whereby a portion of the damages were com-
pensatory rather than penal. Satisfaction of the compensatory damages
by one released the others,3 9 while payment of the penalty by a co-
28. Buckland, supra note 27 at 454, 456; W. Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and
Their Relation to Modern Law 420 (1938) [hereinafter Burdick].
29. Wylie, supra note 27, § 5, at 34-35; but see Burdick, supra note 28 at 420 n.44
(stating that Savigny is of a different opinion notwithstanding the contrary weight of
opinion).
30. Wylie, supra note 27, § 5, at 35.
31. The early English and American common law "no contribution" rules had similar
problems. See infra text accompanying notes 61-69.
32. -[A] celebrated law ... regulating the compensation to be made for that kind
of damage called 'injurious,' in the cases of killing or wounding the slave or beast of
another." Black's Law Dictionary 818 (5th ed. 1979).
33. Digest 9.2.11.2; see also Burdick, supra note 28 at 421. The civil damages were
considered penal in nature.
34. "In civil . .. law, the privilege of one of several co-sureties (cautioners) to insist
upon paying only his pro rata share of the debt. La. Civ. Code arts. 3045-3051." Black's
Law Dictionary 143 (5th ed. 1979).
35. Wylie, supra note 27, § 5, at 34-35; id. § 35, at 308, 314-15; Code J., 8.41.28;
4.65.13.
36. Buckland, supra note 27, at 43 4. Little practical difference between correality
and solidarity remained in the Digest.
37. Delicts were divided into four groups by Justinian: theft (furtum, J. Inst. 4.1.1);
robbery (rapina, J. Inst. 4.2, pr.); injury (injuria, Dig. 9.2.5.1); and damage (damnum
G. Inst. 3.211).
38. Burdick, supra note 28 at 504-10.
39. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law § 646 (4th Ed. 1956); Dig. 2.10.1.4; 4.2.14.15.
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injurer failed to exonerate the others. 40 At last, solidary liability for
compensatory damages carried with it a right of contribution.
Justinian probably considered the effect of an insolvent tortfeasor
when two or more injured a person. Bankruptcy debtor laws indicate
that the Roman law regularly dealt with the insolvency issue. Cognizant
of the risks created by impecunious parties, Roman lawmakers devel-
oped appropriate remedies, such as making insolvent judgment debtors
slaves of their creditors. 4' Book nine of the Digest deals with negligence
and delictual principles and, in pertinent part, states that "when the
money is received [by the plaintiff], the others [are] compellable ...
to contribute their share with [what is due for] the damage to the one
who paid.' ' 42 Implicit in'this precept is the recognition that in some
situations one party remitted the entire amount of the judgment, ac-
quiring contemporaneously a right of contribution from the other
injurers. Justinian could have allocated the insolvency risk among all
parties, including the victim. 4 3 The failure to do so suggests that
cotortfeasors bore that risk among themselves.
English and American Common Law
English Courts recognized joint and several liability as early as
1691. In Smithson v. Garth,44 three individuals attacked the plaintiff;
one held him, another battered him, and the third stole his silver
buttons. Assessing damages for false imprisonment, battery, and tres-
pass, with each held liable for the whole, the court announced that
the parties must act in concert for the victim to utilize this theory of
recovery.4 5 Additionally, since at this time joinder was not compulsory,
the victim could sue any wrongdoer for the entire damages, although
he was limited to one recovery.
40. Dig. 47.4.1.19; 9.2.11.2; Sohm, supra note 27, § 74, at 383 n.5 (penalties);
Buckland, supra note 27, at 452-53. But see Dig. 2.10.1.4: "If several are guilty of
contrivance, all are liable; but if one of them pays the penalty, the rest are discharged
41. G. Inst. 4.21.
42. Dig. 9.3.4 (emphasis added).
43. Burdick, supra note 28, at 417. Classical law at the time of the compilation by
Justinian recognized certain types of divisible obligations. See also Dig. 45.2.11.1.
44. 83 Eng. Rep. 711 (1691).
45. Accord Sadler v. Great Western Ry. Co., (1896) A.C. 450. The court denied
joint suit absent concerted action. This case presented an inequitable result inasmuch as
the railroad company defendants produced no damage individually. The combined activities
created quantifiable damage but their acts were separate. Lord Justice Rigsby had dissented
from a similar disposition by the Court of Appeal; his words accurately depict this




Upon paying the damages, tortfeasors inevitably sought contri-
bution from the other wrongdoers. In Merryweather v. Nixan, 6 the
court denied a right of contribution between joint wrongdoers. 47 In
that case, one joint wrongdoer, having satisfied the entire claim, sought
one-half reimbursement from the other. Affirming the trial court's
nonsuit of the plaintiff's action, Lord Kenyon implied that delictual
contribution did not exist, stating "that he had never before heard of
such an action ...where the former recovery was for tort. ' 48 But in
Merryweather, the injuries were intentionally inflicted and involved
concerted action, hence Lord Kenyon held what had always been true,
that there is no right of contribution for intentional acts. 49 Later English
cases recognized this distinction between intentional and negligent acts
and allowed contribution absent a willful and conscious act. 0
In assessing the amount of contribution, a distinction existed de-
pending upon whether the action was one at law or in equity. In cases
at law, liability was allocated on a per capita basis depending on the
number of persons originally liable. In equity cases only solvent tort-
feasors who were within the jurisdiction of the court were considered
when computing liability. Eventually all English courts settled upon
the latter."
Colonial America adopted both the English common law rules of
joint and several liability and of contribution. In the absence of con-
certed action or mutual responsibility, injured parties could not sue
multiple tortfeasors under the allegation of joint and several liability.5 2
46. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). For an excellent critique of this decision, see Williams,
The Rule in Merryweather v. Nixan, 17 L.Q. Rev. 293 (1901).
47. Prosser surmised from a "very meagre report of the case" that the judgment
was joint and they acted in concert inasmuch as English rules of procedure during this
period allowed joinder only upon such proof. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of
Torts § 50, at 336 (5th ed. 1984).
48. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
49. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merry-
weather v. Nixan, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 176, 177-79 (1898).
50. See, e.g., Betts v. Gibbins, III Eng. Rep. 22 (1834). In that case, Chief Justice
Lord Denman asserted that Merryweather had been "strained beyond what the decision
will bear" and that the general rule of no contribution or indemnity had a exception
where the act was not clearly illegal in itself. The court granted indemnity because the
planitiff's acts, although possibly negligent, were not illegal. Id. at 29. See also Pearson
v. Shelton, 150 Eng. Rep. 533 (1836); Adamson v. Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 693, 696 (1827)
(limited Merryweather and stated that "the rule that wrong-doers cannot have redress or
contribution against each other is confined to cases where the person seeking redress must
be presumed to have known that he was doing an unlawful act").
51. See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Penn. L.
Rev. 130, 135 n.22.
52. See Russell v. Tomlinson, 2 Conn. 206 (1817), Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9 (1829),
and Van Steenburgh v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562 (N.Y. 1837) (where dogs of multiple owners
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A mere connection to the occurrence was insufficient to create a joint
tort; rather "there must be some community in the wrong-doing among
the parties [and] the injury must in some sense be their joint work." 53
Confusion between the rationale for joinder of claims and joint
torts caused an expansion in a victim's ability to sue all injurers
regardless of the "community in the wrong-doing. 5 4 The early common
law rules of joinder were extremely strict and, like the rules governing
joint and several liability, required concerted action to join defendants
under a single cause of action." Some recognized the distinction, 6 but
as rules of pleading and procedure5 7 became more liberal, joint tort
concepts tagged along.5"
The doctrine of single indivisible injury was an additional limitation
on joint and several liability. For joint and several liability to be
imposed, the harm must have been of such a type that it was not
practically apportionable, "that is, an injury which cannot be appor-
tioned with reasonable certainty to the individual wrongdoers." ' 59 While
these torts were not "joint" torts, properly speaking, the courts ex-
hibited "an ever increasing tendency . . . to impose joint and several
liability for the damage caused by such wrongs." ' 60 This almost limitless
expansion of the class of joint and severally liable injurers was probably
unwarranted in light of the underlying policies. In an effort to com-
pensate victims fully, the courts created a rule of law that made joint
worried or killed plaintiff's sheep); P. Bliss, Law of Pleading, §§ 82 & 83, at 106-10
(1879).
53. J. Pomeroy, Code Remedies: Remedies and Remedial Rights § 209, at 303 (4th
ed. 1904). Some examples will illustrate how American courts gave effect to the distinction.
A municipality was not jointly liable with a city lot owner who negligently dug and left
open a hole in the street because they did not jointly produce the injury. Trowbridge v.
Forepaugh, 14 Minn. 133 (Gil. 100) (1869). But two railroad companies who each had
an employee at fault, utilized the same track, and subsequently injured a passenger in a
collision were jointly liable. Colegrove v. New York & New Haven Ry. Co., 20 N.Y.
492 (1859).
54. J. Pomeroy, Code Remedies: Remedies and Remedial Rights § 209, at 303 (4th
ed. 1904); see also F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of Torts § 10.1, at 10-11
(2d ed. 1986); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 47, at 324-26 (5th ed.
1984).
55. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 U. Calif. L. Rev. 413, 418 (1937)
56. See Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 Pac. 782 (1923) (where the victim could
sue two injurers who were not joint tortfeasors and the trial judge must instruct the jury
to assess the damages separately).
57. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
58. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 413, 413-21 (1937);
see also F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of Torts § 10.1, at 10-11 (2d ed.
1986).
59. Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 256, 248 S.W.2d
731, 734 (1952).
60. F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of Torts § 10.1, at 4-5 (2d ed. 1986).
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tortfeasors out of practically all negligent cotortfeasors. Thus, by virtue
of the attributes of joint and several liability, each tortfeasor became
a guarantor of the victim's complete financial recovery.
American courts generally disallowed contribution between tort-
feasors. 61 The courts held to this rule firmly when the wrongdoing was
intentional. 62 Contribution was an equitable remedy63 and courts jus-
tified this rule under the "clean hands" doctrine. 64 An intentional
wrongdoer could not seek relief from the court. However, some au-
thority exists for the proposition that American common law allowed
contribution when the tortfeasor's conduct was not willful, malicious,
intentional, or immoral. 6 This distinction between intentional and neg-
ligent acts met its demise when the courts liberalized the rules of
joinder. For the sake of judicial efficiency, the courts allowed a victim
to join virtually any party against whom a claim might be asserted
for a "complete determination . . . of the question involved. ' '66 In the
process, the judiciary disregarded the policy considerations for con-
tribution when the underlying tort sounded in negligence and "refused
to permit contribution, even where independent, although concurrent,
negligence had contributed to a single result. ' 67 Collusion between
plaintiffs and defendants ensued. 61 Since the plaintiff had unfettered
discretion to sue any tortfeasor, each had a motive to bribe the victim. 69
61. See P. Bliss, Law of Pleading § 89, at 114 (1879). See also Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence § 2339, at 5173-76 (4th ed. 1919); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts
§ 50, at 337 (5th ed. 1984); Union Stockyard Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co., 196
U.S. 217, 25 S. Ct. 226 (1905).
62. See, e.g., Arnold v. Clifford, 2 U.S. (2 Sumner) 238 (1835) (publishing a libel);
Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. 131 (N.Y. 1816) (cutting another's timber); Miller v. Fenton, 11
Paige Sc. 18 (N.Y. 1844) (stealing bank funds).
63. 4 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1418, at 1070-71 (5th ed. 1941).
64. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130,
131 (1932) "In a number of well known fields the law has manifested its unwillingness
to come to the aid of persons whose conduct does not conform to legal standards,
particularly if such persons, in order to make out a case, have to set up the non-
conforming conduct as a part thereof."
65. See, e.g., Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887) (negligent
construction of a building); Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870)
(negligent maintenance of a bridge); Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); Horbach v.
Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851) (negligent injury of a stagecoach passenger); Thweatt v. Jones,
22 Va. (1 Rand.) 328 (1923) (negligent misdelivery of tobacco receipts).
66. New York Code of Procedure § 118 (1849). See also note 105.
67. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 50, at 306 (4th ed. 1971).
68. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130,
137-38 (1932).
69. In a particularly ingenious maneuver, a corporation purchased its subsidiary's
potential liability. After judgment, but prior to execution, the victim assigned its rights
to the parent corporation, presumably in exchange for satisfaction of the debt. As assignee,
the parent sued the other tortfeasor and the court granted full recovery. Pennsylvania
Co. v. West Penn. Ry. Co., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924).
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Legal scholars consistently advocated contribution in negligence-
based torts.7" In their view, tortfeasors deserved the benefits of con-
tribution absent immoral or intentional conduct. Few writers of the
twentieth century advocated the no contribution rule. 71 Bowing to the
scholarly pressure and recognizing the inequity of no contribution,
forty-three states adopted contribution to some extent by statute or
judicial decision.7 2 Six states eliminated the need for contribution by
adopting comparative negligence statutes, which abrogate joint and
70. One scholar had harsh criticism for the no contribution rule:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire
burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally re-
sponsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to . . . the plaintiff's
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes
scot free.
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971). See also Jackson, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 17 Tex. L. Rev. 399 (1939); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Penn. L. Rev. 130 (1932); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 U. Calif. L. Rev. 413 (1937); Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 176 (1898).
71. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 1156 (1941); Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 175
(1958).
72. See Alaska Stat. §§ 9.16.010 to .060 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2501
to 2504, 2506, 2508, 2509 (Supp. 1987); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-61-201 to 212 (1987); Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code §§ 875 to 883 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-50.5-
101 to 106 (1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 6301 to 6308 (1974); Fla. Stat. § 768.31
(1984); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-32 (Supp. 1988); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 663-11 to 17 (1985
& Supp. 1987); Idaho Code §§ 6-803 to 807 (1979 & Supp. 1988); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
70, §§ 301 to 305 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Iowa Code Ann. § 668.5 (West 1987); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 412.030 (Banks-Baldwin 1979); La. Civ. Code art. 2324; Packard v.
Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971); Md. Ann. Code art. 50, §§ 16 to 24 (1986); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231B, §§ 1 to 4 (West 1986); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2925a
to .2925d (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.02 (West 1988 & Supp.
1989); Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.060 (Vernon 1988); Mont.
Code Ann. § 27-1-703 (1987); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 193 Neb.
752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 17.225 to .305 (1986); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 507:7-f to i (Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.3 (West 1987); N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 41-3-1 to 8 (1986 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 1401 to 1404 (McKinney
1976); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ IB-I to 6 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-38-01 to 04 (1976
& Supp. 1987); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.31 to .33 (Page Supp. 1987); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 832 (West 1988); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 18.430 to .460 (1988); Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. tit. 42, §§ 8321 to 8327 (Purdon 1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-1 to 11 (1985);
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (La. Co-op Supp. 1988); S.D. Codified Laws Ann.
§§ 15-8-11 to 22 (1984 & Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-11-101 to 106 (1980);
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 33.011 to .016 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989); Va.
Code Ann. §§ 8.01-34 to 35.1 (1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4.22.040 to .925 (1988);
W. Va. Code z 55-7-13 (1981); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 113.01 to .11 (West 1988).
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several liability. 3 Alabama is now the only state that continues the
no contribution rule.74
Under these contribution statutes or judicial decisions, a codefen-
dant could generally recover all but his per capita share; in other
words, division among tortfeasors was into equal shares. This arbitrary
apportionment was a function of the legal system's concern that juries
could not accurately allocate fault among the parties. 75 The jury was
responsible for a determination whether the victim was at fault, but
only as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery, not as an assessment of
percentages among the parties.
Comparative negligence generally replaced contributory negligence
as a means of handling the fault of a victim. Gone from the legal
system was the perception that juries could not allocate fault, partic-
ularly when the court provided guidance. 76 This adoption of compar-
ative negligence led to arguments that the courts could utilize the jury's
fault assessment to abrogate joint and several liability and hold each
tortfeasor liable for his respective share of the damage. Some states
enacted legislation to this effect, but courts of other states dispelled
any indication that "adoption of comparative negligence . . . war-
rant[ed] the abolition or contraction of the established 'joint and several
liability' doctrine. . . ."'I
Throughout this time frame the injurer bore the insolvency risk.
Provided any one tortfeasor possessed sufficient wealth, the injured
73. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1988); Ind. Code Ann. §§
34-4-33-1 to 14 (West Supp. 1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a (1983); Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-37, 38 (1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1988); Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-
109 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
74. See, e.g., Crigler v. Salac, 438 So. 2d 1375 (Ala. 1983), Kennedy Engine Co. v.
Dog River Marina & Boatworks, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1214 (Ala. 1983), Shearman Concrete
Pipe Mach., Inc. v. Gadsden Concrete & Metal Pipe Co., Inc., 335 So. 2d 125 (Ala.
1976); Home Ins. Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle, Inc., 291 Ala. 601, 285 So. 2d 468, 91 A.L.R.3d
833 (1973).
75. See L. Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American
Jury, 43 A.B.A.J. 1005, 1006 (1957) (where Mr. Powell, prior to becoming a United
States Supreme Court Justice, argued that juries typically disregard instructions and "render
verdicts based on their own opinion of 'justice' notwithstanding the victim's "minor
contributory negligence."); S. Speiser, C. Krause and A. Ganes, The American Law of
Torts § 1312, at 691 (1986) "[Alpportionment of relative fault by a jury cannot be
scientifically done, as such precise measurement is impossible."
76. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Calif., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872,
532 P.2d 1226, 1240 (1975) "The temptation for the jury to resort to a quotient verdict
... can be great. These inherent difficulties are not . . . insurmountable. Guidelines might
be provided the jury which will assist in keeping it focussed (sic) upon the proper inquiry
[such as] special verdicts and jury interrogatories ...."
77. American Motorcycle Association v. Viking Motorcycle Club, 20 Cal. 3d 578,
582, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184; 578 P.2d 899, 901 (1978); see also Coney v. J.L.G. Industries,
Inc., 97 III. 2d 104, 121-22, 73 I11. Dec. 337, 345, 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (1983).
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party recovered one hundred percent of his damage from that tort-
feasor. All of the collection risks-insolvency, inability to obtain service
of process, or the inability to identify the tortfeasor-rested on the
solvent injurers.
French Law
French law recognized in solido obligations "where several persons
. . . concurred in an injury. 78 Article 5579 of the Penal Code is the
only French statute dealing with solidary liability, but the French
"jurisprudence has never hesitated to maintain solidarity outside the
realm of criminal acts." 80 Originally, only intentional, concerted action
created solidarity. The jurisprudence later expanded solidary liability
by requiring only an indivisible injury, with no requirement of concerted
action or a common interest.8 The injurers did not have the benefit
of division. A tortfeasor could not require the victim to proceed against
the others. In essence, the injured party possessed complete discretion
and could recover from any tortfeasor . 2 The solidary tortfeasors,
however, owed only one debt. Payment by one satisfied the debt for
all others.83 Pothier suggested any payment should have this effect,
even a preexisting sum owed from the victim to one of the injurers.
French law recognized a right of contribution among cotortfeasors.
Pothier acknowledged the "no contribution" principles of Roman ju-
rists, but stated that French law was more "indulgent. '8 4 Tortfeasors
78. 1 M. Pothier, Law on Obligations § 268, at 231 (W. Evans trans. 1853). But
see Toullier, Le Droit Civil Francais 23-28 (5th ed. 1830) (B. Miller trans. 1976). Toullier
asserts that contravention and quasi offenses (i.e., negligence based torts) should not
create solidary liability. Solidarity created in article 55 of the Penal Code should be
confined to crimes and offenses because their intentional nature creates a common will
just as with conventional solidarity. Id. at 25. Nevertheless, it appears solidarity was
generally the result since the Penal Code sanctioned many negligent acts, such as cultivating
the soil with an iron rather than a bamboo rake.
79. Article 55 French Penal Code states:
All individuals found guilty of the same crime or of the same offense are bound
in solido for fines, restitution, damages and costs.
Translated in Toullier, Le Droit Civil Francais 24 (5th ed. 1830) (B. Miller trans. 1976).
80. 2 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. I § 900, at 503 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
trans. 1959). The Decree of June 18, 1811, article 156 stated that article 55 applied
whether the claim was asserted in civil or criminal court. 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit
Civil Francais § 298b, at 19 n.5 (E. Bartin 6th ed.) in 1 Civil Law Translations (A.
Yiannopoulos trans. 1965).
81. 4 C. Aubry and C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 298b, at 24-25 (E. Bartin 6th
ed.) in 1 Civil Law Translations (A. Yiannopoulos trans. 1965).
82. 1 M. Pothier, Law of Obligations § 270, at 232 (W. Evans trans. 1853).
83. 1 M. Pothier, Law of Obligations § 273, at 233 (W. Evans trans. 1853).
84. 1 M. Pothier, Law of Obligations § 282, at 245-46 (W. Evans trans. 1853).
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were not arbitrarily liberated from a debt at another tortfeasor's ex-
pense wholly at the victim's whim. An injurer who paid the whole
possessed an action against the others for their respective parts.85
Whether that part was per capita or prorata is unclear. In support of
prorata contribution, Planiol suggested that if the actors' faults were
disproportionate, liability should be similarly divided . 6 Thus a tort-
feasor five percent at fault probably possessed an action to recover
ninety-five percent of the damages from the other tortfeasors. This
apportionment of financial responsibility affected the rights between
the actors only.1
7
The tortfeasors bore the risk of a codebtor's insolvency.8 An
exception existed for any discharged injurer, such as by transaction or
compromise. In that situation the victim suffered the discharged deb-
tor's portion of any subsequent insolvency. 9
Louisiana Law
Article 2324 is derived from article 230490 of the 1825 Louisiana
Civil Code. The translators of the earlier article's French text incorrectly
substituted "jointly" for "in solido." Prior to the legislative amend-
ment to reconcile the English with the French version, 91 courts followed
the translated text only92 and held cotortfeasors jointly liable. 93 After
85. French Civ. Code art. 1214 (J. Crabb trans. 1977).
86. 2 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise § 904, at 505 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans.
1959); "[I]f the faults committed by each of the authors of the damage are not equal
in gravity, the partition of the indemnity can be made in unequal parts depending upon
the contribution to be established between them. (Cass., 26 Nov. 1907, D.1908.1.139)."
87. 4 C. Aubry and C. Rau, Cours De Droit Civil Francais § 298b, at 26 (6th ed.
La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965) in I Civil Law Translations (A. Yiannopoulos trans. 1965).
88. 2 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. 1 § 771, at 415 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
trans. 1959).
89. 1 M. Pothier, Law of Obligations § 275, at 235 and § 278, at 239 (W. Evans
trans. 1853). La. Civ. Code art. 1803 contains an identical rule. Comment (b) states, "In
case of transaction, compromise, or settlement between the obligee and one of the solidary
obligors, the liability of the other solidary obligors is reduce in the amount of the portion
of that obligor, as in the case of settlement between the victim of a tort and one joint
tortfeasor."
90. La. Civ. Code art. 2304 (1825) states:
He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages
in the commision of it, is answerable, jointly with that person, for the damage
caused by such act. (emphasis added).
91. 1844 La. Acts No. 20.
92. But see La. Acts No. 1808 § 5, which states that upon finding any "obscurity,
fault, or omission, both the English and French texts shall be consulted."
93. See, e.g., Villere v. Graeter, 7 Rob. 203 (La. 1844); Loussade v. Hartman, 16
La. 117 (1840).
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the legislative correction the Louisiana Supreme Court announced that
"in consequence of the act of 1844, the rule [of joint rather than
solidary liability] has ceased to be important. '9 4
In a second line of cases involving tort claims and solidarity, the
court drew upon the articles dealing with obligations. The redactors
of these code articles defined solidarity by its principal effects. A
solidary obligation was one in which the debtors were "all obligated
to the same thing; so that each may be compelled for the whole, and
when the payment which is made by one of them, exonerates the others
towards the creditor." 95 Another article stated that a "creditor of an
obligation contracted in solido" possessed the right to collect from
"any one of the debtors he please[d].'' 96
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Cline v. Crescent City R.R.
Co.,97 engrafted negligence-based solidary liability onto article 2324
using the general obligations articles pertaining to solidary liability. 98
The plaintiff averred that the defendants' negligence caused fatal in-
juries to her husband. Defendants' counsel argued that "when two
persons are guilty of negligence each is responsible for the consequences
of his own acts," and that article 2324 applied only "where two or
more persons willfully wrong another." 99 Inasmuch as solidarity is not
presumed'O° and the plaintiff had offered no express authority for
imposing solidary liability, the defendants asserted that the obligation,
if any, was joint.
Although the defendants' argument correctly stated the law in this
case, Justice Watkins rejected their contention. His analysis was
straightforward. Solidary obligations exist "on the part of the debtors
when they are all obliged to the same thing . . . although .. . the
debtors [are] obligated differently . . . and by different acts or at
different times."'' As for the defendants' contention that the law
failed to provide negligence-based solidarity, the court found that "there
are many contracts in which the obligation is declared by law to be
in solido, without any express stipulation."' 0 2 Some of these contracts
"may be found in the chapter which treats of 'offenses and quasi
offenses,"' such as "art[icles] .. .2315 .. .2316 .. .2317 [or] 2320."03
94. Byrne v. Riddell, 3 La. Ann. 670, 670 (1848).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 2086 (1825).
96. La. Civ. Code art. 2089 (1825).
97. 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889).
98. La. Civ. Code arts. 2077-2107 (1870).
99. 41 La. Ann. 1031, 1038, 6 So. 851, 854 (1889) (emphasis in original).
100. La. Civ. Code art. 2093 (1870). "An obligation in solido is not presumed ......
101. 41 La. Ann. at 1039, 6 So. at 854. (emphasis in original).
102. Id. (emphasis in original). La. Civ. Code art. 2107 (1870).
103. 41 La. Ann. at 1039, 6 So. at 854-55 (emphasis in original).
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Each of these articles, said the court, had been found to create ob-
ligations that were solidary, though none contained any express stip-
ulation to that effect.10 4
Cline marked the beginning of a continued erosion of distinction
between the solidary effects of intentional and negligent acts. Civil
Code article 2324 provided solidary liability for intentional or con-
spiratorial acts and article 2107, in conjunction with Justice Watkins'
broad statements in Cline, created the potential for virtually limitless
application of negligence-based solidary liability. The courts thereafter
proceeded to recognize solidarity in a number of negligence cases. 05
Gone from the jurisprudence was any hint of the intentional act re-
quirement for tort-based solidary liability.
The supreme court later suppressed another possible limitation on
the application of solidarity. Prior to the 1979 amendment, article 2324
stated: "He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or
assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido,
with that person for the damage caused by such act.' 0 6 Arguably,
"unlawful act" was something more egregious than negligence or strict
liability. The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, in Hartman v.
Greene, 0 7 stated that "unlawful act" meant any wrongful act or tort
for which a civil action lies. The term connoted much more than just
criminal activity. 08
An indivisible injury was the remaining requirement for the im-
position of solidary liability on multiple tortfeasors. But this concept
evolved into one that could be met in about any personal injury case.
The change began with Judge Covington's dissent in Bergeron v.
Thomas. 0 9 The case arose from a three-car pileup involving two suc-
cessive collisions with the decedent's automobile, and presented the
question of which impact killed the driver. The trial court and majority
opinion found the second collision insignificant when compared to the
the initial 50 m.p.h. head-on collision and refused to hold the second
motorist a solidary obligor for the entire damage. Judge Covington,
104. 41 La. Ann. at 1039, 6 So. at 855. The court additionally held that this ruling
in no way effected the parties' right to sever the trials. Id.
105. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Penn Bridge Co., 131 La. 196, 59 So. 119 (1912)
(negligently killed construction worker); Abrego v. Tri-State Transit Co., 22 So. 2d 681
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1945) (negligently injured automobile passenger).
106. Emphasis in original.
107. 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 612, 60 S. Ct. 180 (1939).
108. Justinian agreed with this definition. Dig. 9.2.51 (where Ulpianus considered an
injury due to negligence against the law).
109. 314 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 318 So. 2d 54 (1975).
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incensed by the result under the majority's legal theory," '0 felt that
allocating the injuries with any certainty was "beyond the capabilities
of any mortal known to [him]." However, he advocated a test enun-
ciated by the Iowa Supreme Court and opined that an indivisible injury
occurs when "it is not reasonably possible to make a division of the
damage caused by the separate acts of negligence.""' In his view, it
was "vexatiously incomprehensible ... that the 'single indivisible in-
jury' doctrine should not be applied.""' 2 Shortly thereafter, the supreme
court adopted Judge Covington's approach by way of a footnote in
Sampay v. Morton Salt Co.,"3 notwithstanding article 2324's wording
at that time." 4 Subsequently an author accurately noted, "the juris-
prudence has obscured the lucid and cogent theory underlying article
2324." 1 The author further asserted that common law joint and several
liability reasoning had "perforated the Code's tidy confines.""116
Authority for contribution among tortfeasors was provided by ar-
ticle 2103 of the 1870 Civil Code." 7 Initially, the courts denied a
tortfeasor's contribution claim. In Sincer v. Bell,"' for example, the
supreme court read article 2103 literally, requiring a "contract in
solido" to enforce any contribution claim. Since there was "no contract
[between] Bell [and] Sincer," 1 9 the court dismissed the cotortfeasor's
claim. Later, in Quatray v. Wicker,2 0 the court refined and limited
110. "The majority denies recovery against [the second driver] and his insurer ...
where damage was done to innocent animate victims. I suffer from various maladies, but
misoneism is not one of them." 314 So. 2d at 429. Webster defines "misoneism" as "a
hatred or intolerance of something new or changed." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1444 (1986).
111. 314 So. 2d at 428.
112. 314 So. 2d at 429.
113. 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) "[Prior to 1979 [article] 2324 appears to envision a
situation where an intentional tort has been perpetrated by co-conspirators. However, the
jurisprudence has interpreted the article to include indivisible damage caused by concurrent
negligence." Id. at 329 n.l.
114. "He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages
in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused
by such an act." (prior to 1979 La. Acts No. 431.)
115. Comment, Prescribing Solidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity Dilemma, 41 La.
L. Rev. 659, 687 (1981).
116. Id.
117. La. Civ. Code art. 2103 (1870) states:
The obligation contracted in solido towards the creditor, is of right divided
amongst the debtors, who, amongst themselves, are liable each only for his part
and portion. This article is derived verbatim from La. Civ. Code art. 2099
(1825).
118. 47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So. 755 (1895).
119. Id. at 1550, 18 So. at 756.
120. 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933).
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Sincer, allowing a contribution claim between tortfeasors cast in judg-
ment as solidary obligors. The court held that Sincer was inapposite
"to a case where two joint tortfeasors have been judicially condemned,
in solido, [as opposed to a settlement agreement] to pay damages."''
The courts and the legislature continued to grapple with the doctrine
of contribution. 22 The Third-Party Practice Act 23 expanded the theory of
joinder and limited a party's right to sever trials. 1 The second circuit,
in Kahn v. Urania Lumber Co. ,121 held that this Act did not grant a
defendant contribution rights against a joint tortfeasor who was not sued
by the victim. The legislature, apparently dissatisfied with the rule, amended'16
article 2103127 to give a defendant sued on a solidary obligation the right
"to seek contribution . . . by making [the joint tortfeasor] a third party
defendant in the suit ... whether or not the third party defendant was
sued by the plaintiff initially." The supreme court subsequently bowed to
the Legislature's obvious intent to allow contribution among joint tort-
feasors. 2 The 1984 Obligations Revision 29 continued the right of contri-
121. Id. at 296, 151 So. at 210. Furthermore the court anticipated inconsistency
arguments and stated, "Whether . . . Sincer can be reconciled . . . is a matter which does
not concern us in the present case." Id.
122. 1954 La. Acts No. 433.
123. See generally Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 22 La. L. Rev.
818 (1962).
124. 1954 La. Acts No. 433, § 1 states, in part:
In any civil action presently pending or hereafter filed, the defendant in a
principal action may by petition bring in any person (including a co-defendant)
who is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
principal demand.
125. 103 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
126. 1960 La. Acts No. 30, § 1.
127. La. Civ. Code art. 2103 (1870) as amended states:
When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obligation arises
from a contract, a quasi contract, an offense, or quasi offense, it should be
divided between them. As between the solidary debtors each is liable only for
his virile portion of the obligation.
A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may
seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary codebtor by
making him a third party defendant in the suit, as provided in Articles 1111
through 1116 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not the third party
defendant was sued by the plaintiff initially, and whether the defendant seeking
to enforce contribution if he is cast admits or denies liability on the obligation
sued on by the plaintiff.
128. Brown v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 243 La. 271, 142 So. 2d 796 (1962); See
also Breaux v. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co., 147 So. 2d 693 (1962) The court found ample
authority for the rule that a defendant . . . may, by third party petition, implead and
demand contribution from an alleged co-tort feasor (sic)." Id. at 695.
129. 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 1.
13711989]
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
bution in article 1804 which "synthesizes the rule contained in . . . the
final paragraph of [article] 2103 (1870),"1 30 and in article 1805, which
"reproduces the substance of the second paragraph of [article] 2103
(1870)."'I'l Additionally, the revision eliminated any uncertainty surrounding
the share each solidary obligor bore: "As solidary obligors, each is liable
for his virile portion," which for an offense or quasi-offense "is pro-
portionate to the fault of each obligor.113 2 When a solidary codebtor was
insolvent, the loss was "equally shared amongst all the other solvent co-
debtors."' 33 If a debtor renounced solidarity as to a creditor then the
debtor bore the renounced creditor's portion of any insolvency loss. 134
Similar to the common and French law, Louisiana law prevented the victim
from suffering any of the insolvency risk provided at least one tortfeasor
possessed adequate financial wherewithal.
History teaches many things. The current expanded application of
solidary liability warrants the legislature's attempt to limit solidarity. But
the legislature may have been well advised to delineate a definition of
joint tortfeasor, with a clear statement of legislative intent. The present
law, while possibly reducing tortfeasor liability, leaves victims unprotected
in situations meritorious of complete recovery. This flaw is later exhibited.
Absent legislative correction, the judiciary can take the initiative to reinstate
solidary liability principles as originally designed.
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 2324(B)
The drafters of the 1987 amendment to article 2324(B) left much to
be desired in their choice of words. Many aspects of the amendment create
interpretive difficulties, but three phrases in the article are particularly
troublesome. First, in the initial clause of the first sentence, a tortfeasor
is made solidarily liable to the extent necessary for the victim to recover
fifty percent "of his recoverable damages." If a distinction exists between
recoverable damages and damages, the definition may affect the extent of
solidary liability. Second, 'in the same sentence, the article contains an
exception to limited solidarity if solidary liability is "otherwise provided
by law." This exception potentially eliminates the application of article
2324(B). Third, the phrase "liability. for damages caused by two or more
persons shall be solidary" could expand solidary liability to all tortfeasors
who contribute to a plaintiff's injury. Prior to this amendment, two or
130. La. Civ. Code art. 1804, comment (a).
131. La. Civ. Code art. 1805, comment (b).
132. La. Civ. Code art. 1804.
133. La. Civ. Code art. 2100 (1825) & 2104 (1870).
134. La. Civ. Code art. 2101 (1825) & 2105 (1870). Renunciation occurred when the
debtor waived the solidary nature of the obligation; the creditor might still owe the
obligation to contribe their share of the insolvent part.
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more persons could theoretically cause damage without creating solidary
liability. Possible alternative interpretations exhibiting the interplay of the
ambiguities created conclude this section.
Recoverable Damages
The legislature's choice of the term "recoverable damages" is regret-
table. The pertinent clause of article 2324(B) states, "persons shall be
solidar[ily liable] only to the extent necessary for the person suffering
injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his recoverable damages."
The term "recoverable damages" is ambiguous, for it could mean either
total damages or some portion of the victim's total loss.
Sources of interpretive guidance do not resolve this problem. The
Oxford Dictionary defines recoverable as, "[c]apable of being recovered
or regained."' 35 Another authority defines recoverable as "capable of being
recovered."' 3 6 Related to personal injury damages in another context,' 37
the Louisiana Supreme Court defined recoverable damages, stating that
"the plain, ordinary, and natural meaning" of recoverable is that "which
is able to be recovered; 'obtainable from a debtor or possessor as by
legal process.' "I3" Little question exists that damages assessed against an
insolvent defendant or fault attributable to a victim cannot be obtained
or regained, therefore they may not be part of recoverable damages.
Insolvency
The first problem associated with delineating the scope of recoverable
damages exists when one of the defendants is insolvent or otherwise
unavailable for collection of the judgment. Recoverable damages might
not include damages that undoubtedly can never be obtained from these
tortfeasors. Suppose plaintiff P suffers $100,000 in damages and two
tortfeasors, A and B cause the injury. A is forty percent at fault and B
is sixty percent at fault. B, however, is insolvent.




In this scenario, two choices exist for computing recoverable damages
135. The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VIII, 272 (1961).
136. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1898 (1986).
137. The question was the interpretation of the term "recoverable" in La. Civ. Code
art. 2402 (1870), which provided that "damages resulting from personal injury to the
wife [are] recoverable by herself."
138. Shield v. F. Johnson & Son Co., 132 La. 773, 776, 61 So. 787, 787 (1913).
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and A's liability. If "recoverable damages" means total damages, then A
would be solidarily liable for fifty percent of the $100,000, or $50,000.
If, on the other hand, "recoverable damages" means the amount that
could be collected without resort to solidarity principles, that amount would
be $40,000 rather than $100,000, and A would be solidarily liable for fifty
percent of that amount, or $20,000.
The second interpretation of "recoverable damages" produces an
anomaly. While A would be solidarily liable for only $20,000, he would
be required to compensate the victim for at least his share of the fault,
or $40,000. Hence, while A would be solidarily liable for $20,000, his
liability stemming from principles other than solidarity-his forty percent
contribution to the total damages-would exceed his solidary portion. By
defining "recoverable damages" in this way, the fifty percent limitation
becomes superfluous. This illustrates how illogical it would be to read
"recoverable damages" in this fashion.
The addition of another solvent tortfeasor reduces the dollar amount
of A's obligation but continues this same anomaly. Suppose C, a solvent
tortfeasor, occasioned thirty percent of the fault, while A contributed only
ten percent.





If "recoverable damages" excludes the sixty percent share of the
insolvent tortfeasor, B, A and C became solidary obligors for $20,000.
Provided C can pay $30,000, A still owes only his share of the fault, or
$10,000. If for some reason C is unable to pay his $30,000 share, then
"recoverable damages" declines still further. A would be a solidary obligor
for fifty percent of these recoverable damages, an amount which contin-
uously decreases with C's ability to pay. Hence, again, A could never
owe more than his share of the fault, and the fifty percent requirement
becomes unnecessary. It is doubtful the legislature intended to eliminate
solidary liability in this manner.
Comparative Fault
A second problem involves whether the term "recoverable damages"
includes the victim's comparative fault. Identical issues and results are at
stake. If the fault of the victim does affect the amount of recoverable
damages, then each solvent tortfeasor owes a correspondingly reduced
solidary obligation. Suppose plaintiff P, who is ten percent at fault, suffers
$100,000 in damages. Two tortfeasors, A and B cause the remainder of
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the injury. A is thirty percent at fault, B is sixty percent at fault. B is
insolvent.





If P's fault reduces recoverable damages, then A is a solidary obligor for
fifty percent of ninety percent of the damages.
The experience of another state may offer some guidance in resolving
this difficult question. In Stovall v. Perius139 an Oregon court interpreted
the term recoverable damages in a similar context, a negligent victim and
a joint and several liability statute. The statute at issue provided that "a
defendant whose percentage of fault is less than that allocated to the
plaintiff is liable to the plaintiff only for that percentage of the recoverable
damages." 1'4' As a result of an automobile accident, the plaintiff suffered
approximately $200,000 in damages. The jury assigned eighteen percent
fault to the plaintiff, seventy-five percent fault to the defendant city and
seven percent fault to Perius. The statute applied to Perius because the
victim's eighteen percent fault exceeded his seven percent fault. Perius
sought to reduce his share to seven percent of the total fault not attributable
to the victim, which would have been $11,480, rather than seven percent
of the total damages, or approximately $14,000. 4 1 Recapitulating two
legislative committee hypotheticals, the appellate court rejected Perius'
interpretation, agreeing with the trial court "that a percentage commen-
surate with the plaintiff's negligence is not ... deducted before a defen-
dant's liability is computed." 14 2
By analogy, application of the Stovall definition to article 2324(B)
results in no reduction in recoverable damages due to a victim's fault.
Recoverable damages would equal damages in toto. Pursuant to article
2324(B), solidary liability exists "to the extent necessary for' '1 43 fifty
139. 61 Or. App. 650, 659 P.2d 393 (1983).
140. Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.485 (1983); 1987 Or. Laws 774 § 1 amended this section
further limiting a joint tortfeasors liability.
141. The Oregon Tort Claims Act limited the city's liability to $100,000. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 30.270(l)(b) (1988).
142. A Senator and Representative illustrated the statute's effect. If a plaintiff was
40 percent at fault, two defendants were each 30 percent at fault and the damages equaled
$100,000, each defendant would be liable for $30,000. 659 P.2d at 400.
143. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
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percent recovery. If the victim's fault does not reduce recoverable dam-
ages, a defendant would always be solidarily liable for a minimum of
fifty percent of the total damages. The Stovall definition, whereby the
victim's fault does not reduce recoverable damages, produces results
consistent with solidary liability policies; tortfeasors should be fifty
percent solidary obligors for the total damages.
As Otherwise Provided by Law
The biggest snafu of the 1987 amendment is the phrase, "as otherwise
provided by law." In the context of the article, solidary liability is
limited to fifty percent of the damages, unless the "law" otherwise
prescribes solidarity. Any law providing for solidary liability should
continue to have full effect. The difficulty lies in the fact that the codes
and revised statutes are replete with articles and provisions which to
some degree address solidary liability.'" For example, Lloyd's under-
144. This author has identified at least fifty Louisiana statutes, thirty-four Civil Code
articles, and eight Code of Procedure articles that fit this category.
(1) Louisiana Revised Statutes:
3:1371(C) (1987) (penalties for sale or distribution of substandard fertilizers);
6:656(A)(1)(g) & (C) (1986) (liability for director who knowlingly and willfully
makes a loan to a non-credit union member); 6:784 (1986) (liability for
officers and directors related to illegal loans from Homestead or Savings
and Loan Associations); 6:824(3) (1986) (liability of borrower and any party
assuming his obligations to make full repayment); 6:833(A) (1986) (liability
of purchaser and original borrower if property subject to mortgage sold or
transferred); 6:834(A) & (B) (1986) (liability of officer or director who accepts
gifts related to a loan application); 9:3202 (1983) (liability for enticing a
lessee to break a lease); 9:4806 (Supp. 1989) (liability of property owners to
contractor for "Private Works"); 9:5385(B) (Supp. 1989) (liability of mort-
gagee for failure to "produce satisfied promissory note"); 12:92(A) (1969)
(liability of officers and directors for transacting business before receiving
the full paid-in capital); 12:219(B) (1969) (liability of corporation members
related to an exchange of "grossly overvalued" property or services for
shares); 13:1215 (1983) (liability of surety for court costs); 13:2158(A)(25)
(Supp. 1989) (liability of parties related to a writ of fieri facias to pay the
constable's fees); 13:4523 (1968) (liability of surety for court costs); 13:4716(A)
(Supp. 1989) (requiring a "bond in solido" from a person creating a nuisance
to secure a release fo the premises); 15:84(A)(1) (1981) (liability of "sureties
in solido" upon person's failure to appear related to a criminal proceeding
in a city, parish or juvenile court); 15:85(A)(1) (Supp. 1989) (liability of
"sureties in solido" upon person's failure to appear related to a criminal
proceeding in district court); 15:1356(K) (Supp. 1989) (liability of parties
violating the "Louisiana Drug Racketeering Act"); 17:601.4(B) (1982) (liability
of employing agency and retiree for failure to notify retirement board of
trustees that retiree has returned to active service); 22:76(L) (1959) (liability
of directors, officers or agents related to the improper sale of domestic stock
insurers' securities); 22:356(D) (1959) (liability of funeral service association
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writers are solidarily liable on each insured risk, their agreement to the
treasurer for fraudulent assessment of a person's death); 22:499 (Supp. 1989)
(liability of all Lloyd's underwriters); 22:655(B)(1) (Supp. 1989) (Louisiana's
Direct Action Statute); 23:641 (1985) (liability of publisher for distributor's
failure to pay door to door solicitor's commissions); 23:886 (1985) (liability
of any person denying an agricultural laborer's right to work); 23:1192(B)
(1985) (liability of self-insured workers' compensation members for claims
unpaid by the group funds); 23:1550 (1985) (liability of liquidator, receiver
or trustee for distributing partnership property before complete payment of
unemployment compensation contributions); 30:2276(F) (1989) (liability of all
persons related to hazardous wastes for the cleanup of a disposal site); 31:196
(1989) (liability of naked owner to usufructuary for "damages caused by the
naked owner's mining activities"); 33:1349(C) (1988) (liability of local gov-
ernments when using an "interlocal risk management agency" for excess
insurance); 33:1359(C) (1988) (liability of a local housing auhority when using
an "interlocal risk management agency" for excess insurance); 33:1428(A)(13)(d)
(1988) (liability for sheriffs fees related to writ of fieri facias); 33:1704(31)(c)
(1988) (liability for constable fees related to writ of fieri facias); 33:1744
(1988) (liability of constable and his sureties for failure to pay over or deliver
any obligations to a person entitled to the same); 33:4545.11 (1988) (liability
of Louisiana Energy and Power Authority and a municipality related to the
"joint ownership of a project"); 34:807 (1985) (liability of "claimant of the
vessel" and surety related to a vessel seizure); 37:3125(B) (1988) (liability of
autioneer and his surety for the proceeds of a sale); 39:574(B) (1968) (liability
political subdivision governing authority member for issuing bonds contrary
to the law); 40:1299.39(K) (Supp. 1989) (effect of prescription whether a
health care provider or qualified state health care provider); 41:714(B)(2)
(1965) (personal liability of any person purchasing school lands on credit);
41:717(B) (1965) (liability for deferred payments on notes for the sale of
timber from school board property); 44:35(E)(2) (Supp. 1989) (liability of
custodian for failure to produce a public record); 45:4 (1982) (liability of
surety related to the business of air transportation); 46:13 (1982) (liability
for services rendered at a charity hospital for workers' compensation covered
injuries or illnesses); 47:101(B)(1) (1970) (husband and wife liability on a
joint income tax return); 47:116(B) (1970) husband and wife liability on an
estimated income tax declaration); 47:777 (1970) (liability of surety for unpaid
petroleum products taxes); 47:1672(C) (Supp. 1989) (liability for liquidator's
failure to pay all unpaid petroleum taxes); 47:1904 (1952) (liability of assessor
and surety); 47:1957(F) (Supp. 1989) (liability of tax assessor for omissions);
47:2176 (1952) (liability of surety related movables relinquished for tax as-
sessments).
(2) Louisiana Civil Code articles:
1425 (liability of heirs and universal successors); 1786 (obligations with mul-
tiple persons); 1789-1806, 1818-1821, 1885, 1898 & 1905 (various aspects of
solidary obligations); 2324 (liability as solidary or joint; prescription); 2372
(liability between spouses for necessaries); 2905 (liability of joint borrowers
related to a loan for use); 3014 (liability of more than one mandatory);3026
(liability of several principals and a mandatory); 3037; 3045 (liability of
surety to the creditor); 3049 (rights of surety related to "multiple solidary
obligors").
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contrary notwithstanding. 45 The permutations of these provisions create
innumerable possibilities, and ingenious legal arguments to extend them
to tortious solidarity are certain.
Sources of Law in General
Louisiana's legal system uses many sources of law. Louisiana Civil
Code article 1 states: "The sources of law are legislation and custom."
Whether legislation provides for solidarity is readily ascertainable, but
custom is more difficult to identify. Custom develops over time from
repeated practice with "the conviction that the practice has the force
of law."'146 It is difficult to determine when custom obtains the force
of law because society must sufficiently acquiesce in the conduct, a
requirement with few quantifiable features. 147 Despite this difficulty,
Louisiana courts have not hesitated to resort to custom where one clearly
existed. In Succession of Dunn'" the court recognized that custom
authorized the use of succession funds to purchase a grave monument.
In another case, Fontenot's Rice Drier, Inc. v. Farmers Rice Milling
Co., Inc., 49 the court determined that a custom existed in the rice
industry requiring the mill owner to quality sample grain prior to un-
loading the farmer's truck. This custom prevented the mill owner's
subsequent unilateral reduction in price when the milling quantities proved
deficient. Industry and society had continuously consented to these ac-
tions until that conduct acquired the force of law.5 0
The legislature amended the civil code preliminary title,'' articles
1-21, contemporaneously with the revision of article 2324. '12 The sub-
stance of the preliminary title revision seeks to eliminate any doubt and
establish a hierarchy of laws, in which "[clustom may not abrogate
legislation.""' Custom continues as a source of law, and arguably, any
(3) Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles:
37 (action against solidary obligor); 643 (necessary parties and solidary ob-
ligors; 3155.1 (asset requirement for sureties related to a succession; 3222
(liability of succession representative for failure to deposit funds; 4132(A)(3)
(surety for tutor; 4262 (liability of natural cotutors); 5124 (liability of sup-
plemental judicial bond surety); 5152 (surety's ability to plead discussion).
145. La. R.S. 22:499 (Supp. 1989).
146. La. Civ. Code art. 3, comment (b).
147. A. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System § 33, at 49 (1977).
148. 6 La. App. 663 (lst. Cir. 1927).
149. 329 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 333 So. 2d 239 (1976).
150. See generally Tete, The Code, Custom and the Courts: Notes Toward a Louisiana
Theory of Precedent, 48 Tul.L.Rev. 1, 13 (1973).
151. Effective January 1, 1988.
152. Both are a product of the 1987 regular legislative session.
153. La. Civ. Code art. 3.
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custom creating solidary liability is a solidarity law that triggers the
"otherwise provided" exception in article 2324. An argument that this
rationale makes it impossible for the legislature to abrogate custom is
without merit. Laws designed to eliminate custom or limit the exception
to legislative changes only do not provide an exception for "as otherwise
provided by law." The legislature could, if it wished, clearly delineate
the sources of "law" it wishes to leave undisturbed.
On occasion the legislature has expressly limited the sources of law
applicable to an exception. Louisiana Civil Code article 3499 states that
"unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject
to a liberative prescription of ten years." Since article 3499's enactment
predates the amendment to article 2324,1 4 one can infer that the leg-
islature recognized the distinction between law and legislation and in-
tended that the courts acknowledge the difference.' 5
Other sources of law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional
usages, and equity, are "persuasive or secondary sources of law.", 6
Their relegation beneath legislation and custom as secondary sources
does not eliminate their status as law. Several examples of these sources
of law exist. In Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp.,' the supreme court
utilized usages to ascertain the meaning of market value in natural gas
leases. Likewise, in Holland v. Buckley,"8 Justice Tate reexamined the
origins and development of the statutory language in Louisiana Civil
Code article 2321 and announced new jurisprudence removing the re-
quirement that an animal bite victim prove the owner's knowledge of
the animal's dangerous propensity. Doctrinal writings influenced Justice
154. 1983 La. Acts No. 173, § 1.
155. Legal scholars often debated whether article I provided for sources of law aside
from legislation. Prior to the preliminary title revision, article I stated that, "Law is a
solemn expression of legislative will." Currently, Louisiana Civil Code article 2 provides:
"Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will." The comment to new article 2
states that the revision did not change the law in relation to these articles. Somewhat
foreshadowing the effect of the 1987 revision, Professor Yiannopoulos insisted that in
the French revision of old article 1, "law" ought to be translated as legislation. The
original French version of article 1 states: "La loi est une declaration solemnelle de la
volonte' legislative, sur un objet general et de regime interieur." He claimed that the
terminology utilized in new article 2 "alone leaves room for sources of law other than
legislation." See A. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law System § 32 (1971).
156. La. Civ. Code art. 1, comment (b). But see Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113,
119 (La. 1974) (where Justice Tate explained that "prior judicial decisions do not represent
the law" and may be overruled when opposed to current legislative intent. Justice Dennis
agrees with the comment-jurisprudence is not equal to legislation. Ardoin v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1336 (La. 1978). The supremacy of any source
of law is not at issue in article 2324(B). Any source of law which stipulates solidary
liability should satisfy the exception.
157. 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
158. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974).
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Blanche when overruling 142 years of jurisprudence in Bartlett v. Cal-
houn.15 9 The supreme court resorted to the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment in Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co. of Slidell, Inc. 160
to "fill a gap in the law where no express remedy [was] provided." '16'
Thus, any of these sources of law that create solidarity should be a
"law" that "otherwise provide[s]," thus triggering an exception to article
2324(B). 162
Sources of Solidary Liability Law
Prior to the 1984 Obligations Revision, Louisiana Civil Code article
2091 defined an in solido obligation as follows:
There is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors,
when they are all obliged to the same thing, so that each may
be compelled for the whole, and when the payment which is
made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditors.
This article received extensive analysis in tort actions such as Foster v.
Hampton,163 Sampay v. Morton,/4 Hoefly v. Government Employees
Ins. Co.,165 and Narcise v. Illinois Central Ry. Co.166 The basic rule
developed in these cases is that solidary liability exists as a matter of
law where there are coextensive obligations for the same thing. 67 Gone
from the jurisprudence was the earlier requirement of Wooten v. Wim-
berly that an "article of the Code [must] expressly or otherwise impose[]
solidary liability upon" the tortfeasors. 161 Courts also refused to allow
159. 412 So. 2d 597 (La. 1982).
160. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
161. Id. at 120.
162. But see Board of Elementary & Secondary Education v. Nix, 347 So. 2d 147
(La. 1977). The supreme court discussed the use of the phrase "provided by law" in the
context of the Louisiana Constitutions and concluded that the delegates expressly stipulated
that law meant statute or legislation. Id. at 151 & nn. 8-13.
163. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). An employer and employee are solidary obligors for
the latter's negligence during his employment, overruling Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co.,
213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948). The master and servant "are not joint tort-feasors
(sic),[but are] nonetheless obligated for the same thing, repair of the damage to the third
party." 381 So. 2d at 790. See also Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326, 328
(La. 1981) (where the supreme court used virtually identical language).
164. 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981). Employer and employee are solidary obligors for the
latter's negligence during his employment.
165. 418 So. 2d 575 (La. 1982). Uninsured motorist insurer is a solidary obligor with
uninsured tortfeasor.
166. 427 So. 2d 1192 (La. 1983); FELA railroad employer and third party railroad
car manufacturer are solidary obligors for railroad employee's injuries.
167. "The co-extensive obligations for the 'same thing' create the solidarity of the
obligations." This "same thing" was the legal burden placed upon "two or more parties
to pay tort damages concurrently caused by each party." Id. at 1194.
168. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. 1973).
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the fact of different defenses, different prescriptive periods, different
beneficiaries, different elements of damage, or different sources 169 of
liability to preclude solidarity.'70 After the 1984 Obligations Revision,
Louisiana Civil Code article 1794 provides that "[a]n obligation is so-
lidary for the obligors when each obligor is liable for the whole per-
formance." The comment indicates article 1794 "restates the principal
contained" in article 2901 and does not change the law.
The definition of "law" upon which legal scholars and courts agree
when combined with the sources of the "law" of solidarity that predate
the amendment to article 2324 creates an anomaly: the amendment creates
a new and markedly different rule with an unlimited exception that
precludes almost any application of the new rule. The amendment's
legislative history sheds little light on this problem. Initially House Bill
841 altogether eliminated solidary liability among tortfeasors.' 7' The
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure produced amendments, including
the phrase "as otherwise provided by law." No indication of their intent
exists. The proponents of this reform would certainly offer a bill for
consideration by the full legislature without the exception if a reasonable
likelihood of passage existed. Political pressure required this phrase and
other amendments to obtain a majority vote, possibly a true indication
of the legislature's intent.
At least two alternatives exist to solve the ambiguity. First, the
courts could use the exception to circumvent the fifty percent limitation
simply by interpreting "as otherwise provided by law" as including every
previous judicial expression on solidary liability. This reading would
eviscerate the new legislation. Alternatively, the courts could reexamine
the basic policies at stake and restrict the application of solidarity to
occasions of joint action or another appropriate appellation more re-
strictive than every situation where two or more cause damage. 171
The courts could accomplish the latter by defining indivisible injury
as the source of solidary liability. The definition would be more restrictive
than every situation where two actors cause damage. Many times the
courts held an obligation as solidary to invoke the secondary benefits
of interruption of prescription or proper venue. Although admittedly
inconsistent from a purely theoretical viewpoint, the courts could fashion
a rule whereby a broad definition, such as in the cases preceding the
amendment, governs the application of solidary liability's secondary
169. La. Civ. Code art. 1797. A vendor and manufacturer of a defective product nay
be solidary obligors to an injured vendee notwithwtanding the liability arises from different
sources. Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.,
262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972)
170. Narcise, 427 So. 2d at 1195.
171. See supra note 4.
172. See supra text accompanying note 13-23.
19891
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
benefits, while the new indivisible injury definition controls the extent
of solidary liability for payment of damages. From a pragmatic assess-
ment, the competing interests both benefit. The law would provide the
broad rule when applying solidary liability in the context of a prescription
issue, for example when a plaintiff's attorney cannot discover all potential
tortfeasors when receiving a case with two days remaining before pre-
scription lapses. By contrast, when holding actors liable for damages,
only those acting in concert or, under the narrow definition, causing
indivisible harm, become solidary obligors, hence liable for the whole.
Damages by Two or More Persons
Another problem arises in the use of the phrase "liability for dam-
ages caused by two or more persons shall be solidary." Joint tortfeasors
are generally liable in solido,1 7 but two or more actors can cause damage
without becoming joint tortfeasors or, before the amendment, solidary
liable. The textbook example of a scenario in which two tortfeasors
cause injury without becoming joint tortfeasors is the case of a pedestrian
hit and run victim whose injuries are exacerbated when he is struck by
a second motorist. 174 Arguably, the legislature expanded, or at a minimum
enunciated for the first time, the application of solidary liability to such
injuries. Article 2324(B) states that "liability for damages caused by two
or more persons shall be solidary," without qualifying that statement
to a joint tort, indivisible injury, or other appellation used to depict
solidary liability. Article 2324 literally casts defendants liable in solido
for every type of injury, whether apportionable or divisible, provided
two or more caused the victim's damage. Victims with injuries caused
173. See Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985), Rouley v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. La. 1964), Mullin v. Skains, 252 La. 1009, 215
So. 2d 643 (1968), Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So.
2d 122 (1965).
174. See Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961) en banc (where
the court apportioned damages between two tortfeasors who collided with the plaintiff
almost simultaneously); Justified as the risk within the first tortfeasor's duty, subsequent
medical malpractice cases generally hold the injurer solidarily liable and the malpractice
actor only liable for the damages related to the negligent treatment. The court held the
tortfeasor liable for the death of the victim notwithstanding the arguable negligence of
the surgeon in Sauter v. New York Central & Hudson Riv. Ry. Co., 66 N.Y. 50 (N.Y.
App. 1876); Grzybowski v. Connecticut Co., 116 Conn. 292, 164 A. 632 (1933) (where
an automobile and street car struck a pedestrian, the jury could apportion the damage).
See Viou v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, 108 N.W. 891 (1906). The injurer
and physician were not joint tortfeasors. Id. at 103, 108 N.W. at 893. See also Pederson
v. Eppard, 181 Minn. 47, 231 N.W. 393 (1930) and S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans,
The American Law of Torts § 11:33, at 501 (1986). But see Weber v. Charity Hospital
of La. at N.O., 475 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1985) (where the court cast the driver's insurer
liable in solido with a hospital that negligently treated the victim).
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by more than one person could recover fifty percent under the limited
solidarity of article 2324 in situations never before considered joint torts.
Under such a literal interpretation, the legislature broadened the appli-
cation of solidary liability substantially.
The legislature probably did not intend to expand solidary liability
to every occasion where two or more actors cause damage. Any damages
susceptible of apportionment, whether of a type traditionally considered
indivisible, should create a divisible obligation. Each tortfeasor should
then owe his virile or fault based share.
Possible Alternative Interpretations
Multiparty litigation is the norm instead of the exception. Third
party practice allows defendant's the option to join other potentially
liable parties for the adjudication of all reasonably related disputes such
as contribution 17 or indemnity claims in an effort to promote judicial
efficiency. When the fact finder assesses fault against three or more
defendants, the problems interpreting article 2324(B) increase geomet-
rically.
Compromise 7 6 adds to this uncertainty. Consider the situation where
the damages are $100,000, defendant A is thirty percent at fault, B is
fifty percent at fault, C is twenty percent at fault; A compromises with
the plaintiff P and B is insolvent.





Louisiana law177 entitles defendants B and C to a reduction in the
plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the fault of the settling tortfeasor,
175. La. Civ. Code art. 1805 and La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1111-16.
176. La. Civ. Code art. 3071 defines compromise and states in pertinent part: "A
transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for
preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent ....
(emphasis in original).
177. See Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985). See also comment (b) to La.
Civ. Code art. 1803.
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A, regardless of the amount A actually pays. 7 s Therefore, the maximum
combined liability of B and C is seventy percent, or $70,000.
C's liability, as the only remaining solvent tortfeasor depends upon
several definitions discussed above. Recoverable damages should include
the compromised portion of A-type defendants as well as the insolvent
portion of B-type defendants. C becomes a solidary obligor for fifty
percent of $100,000 or $50,000 instead of fifty percent of $70,000 or
$35,000. If the courts choose to reduce recoverable damages by the
compromised tortfeasor's fault, then the thirty percent fault attributable
to A should not subsequently offset the $35,000 solidary obligation of
C. In other words, C should not receive the benefit of A's compromise
to reduce amount of recoverable damages then offset that amount by
the compromise of defendant's fault thus claiming it owed only its virile
share or twenty percent. Moreover, if recoverable damages are further
reduced from $70,000 by B's insolvency to $20,000, C is liable for
recoverable damages equal to its twenty percent fault thereby completely
eliminating in solido liability for C. This again exemplifies the reason
recoverable damages should encompass all damages adjudged by the
fact-finder.
With recoverable damages fixed at one hundred percent of the
assessed damages, the second issue is whether P recovers C's in solido
liability in addition to A's compromised portion or A's compromise
reduces C's obligation. Heretofore C-type defendants always received a
reduction based upon the settling tortfeasor's fault. But the situation
changes when C-type defendants no longer owe the entire remaining
amount under pure solidarity principles. P could be entitled to eighty
percent, that is, A's thirty percent and C's fifty percent solidary liability
or only fifty percent by allowing C to reduce its solidary obligation by
the settling tortfeasor's thirty percent fault. Under the latter choice, C's
obligation is always joint so long as the combined faults of the settling
and compromising tortfeasors are equal to or greater than fifty percent.
More than likely the courts will adopt the latter option. Otherwise a
victim could possibly recover less than fifty percent of the adjudicated
damages. For instance, if P settles with A for less than $30,000 before
trial and C's solidary liability is fifty percent less A's thirty percent,
then P recovers $20,000 from C and receives less than fifty percent of
the damages. To eliminate this possibility, the courts could examine the
actual compromise sums in contravention to previous jurisprudence'79
178. See Joseph v. Ford Motor Co., 509 So. 2d I (La. 1987) (where the settling
tortfeasor, 50 percent at fault, paid almost $2 million of a $2.6 million judgment before
the appellate court reduced the total award to $610,000, the nonsettling tortfeasor is
entitled to reduce its payment by the settling joint tortfeasor's fault, regardless of the
amount a settling tortfeasor actually pays.) Id. at 3.
179. Diggs, 772 F.2d at 190.
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and require the nonsettling tortfeasor pay up to fifty percent of the
damages. Admittedly the amendment authorizes either interpretation; the
judiciary may allow C-type defendants such a reduction.
The requirement in Civil Code article 1806 that losses "arising from
the insolvency of a solidary obligor . . . be borne by the other solidary
obligors in proportion to their portion"' 80 complicates the analysis.
Without abusing the language, the courts could assess C's solidary
liability and then add back the loss associated with B's insolvency. In
the previous example, in addition to and regardless of C's solidary
liability,'' the court could add C's share of B's insolvency8 2 as additional
recovery for P. Since A and C possess fault in a 3 to 2 ratio, C
potentially owes forty percent 8 3 of B's insolvency, or $20,000.
Whether the courts allow this $20,000 additional recovery is a policy
question. Provided the judiciary considers the solidarity limitation a
derogation of public policy and recognizes that the legislature was aware
of article 1806 when adopting the amendment, the additional liability
creates more complete victim recovery. Alternatively, the courts may
disallow such recovery by judging article 2324, as the more specific and
recent legislation, to be the controlling authority. Inasmuch as the su-
preme court's expansive application of solidarity in earlier cases created
the preamendment law, 8 4 the additional recovery is the more probable
result.
Additional interpretative questions arise when the plaintiff is at
fault.'83 Suppose plaintiff P, with $100,000 in damages, is five percent
at fault, while defendant A is fifteen percent at fault, B is seventy
percent at fault, and C is ten percent at fault. Suppose further that
defendant A compromises and B is insolvent.
180. La. Civ. Code art. 1806.
181. Whether $50,000 representing 50 percent of $100,000, 35,000 the first alternative,
20,000 the second alternative, or another.
182. Assistant Professor Chamallas noted that a similar problem existed when the
legislature adopted comparative fault. Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party
Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 La. L. Rev. 373, 392 (1980).
183. C's share is a function of C's fault in relation to the fault of all solvent tortfeasors.
C's fault 20 percent 40 percent
A's fault + C's fault 50 percent
184. The supreme court moved from requiring express codal authority to invoke
principles of solidarity in Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972) to the co-
extensive obligation analysis espoused in Hoefly v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 418
So. 2d 575 (La. 1982). See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
185. Certainly a real life possibility.
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At the outset, whether plaintiff's fault reduces recoverable damages
is the same previously mentioned policy decision.'16 Depending upon
that decision, C would be a solidary obligor for fifty percent of either
$100,000 or $95,000.87
The more weighty question is whether P bears a portion of B's
insolvency by virtue of its comparative negligence. If recoverable damages
are $100,000 then C is a solidary obligor for $50,000. Due to B's
insolvency, C's solidary liability exceeds its fault by $40,000. The ju-
diciary might require that P bear a portion of the insolvency loss based
upon the relative faults of P and C, who possess fault in a I to 3
ratio. C would argue its solidary liability is $13,333 less' or $36,667.
Two reasons dictate a different outcome. First, only "other solidary
obligor[s]," bear the "loss arising from the insolvency of a solidary
obligor."' 8 9 P is not a solidary obligor, thus relieved of the insolvency
loss. Second, the judiciary may make a policy decision whereby the
insolvency loss is not added to the defendant's liability. 19 Pursuant to
the amendment, article 2324 may provide the exclusive noncumulative
remedy; a person is "solidary [liable] only to the extent necessary [for
the victim] to recover fifty percent."' 91
A Jurisprudential Exclusion to Article 2324192
Along with the decision on which situations article 2324 prescribes
limited solidarity for, the courts must consider whether occasions exist
where solidary liability applies regardless of the judicial interpretations
placed on article 2324. Situations are conceivable where application of
186. A question the Oregon Supreme Court answered in the negative when faced with
the identical question. See supra text accompanying notes 135-43.
187. 100,000 - (plaintiff's 5 percent fault) = $95,000.
188. Ratio X Insolvency Loss = 1/3 X $40,000 = $13,333
189. La. Civ. Code art. 1806.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 180-84.
191. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B).
192. At the risk of a hue and cry from the Bar, an example of such a judicial
exception continues as the exception to comparative negligence. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast,
462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
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the fifty percent limitation may not be what the legislature intended.
Under traditional concerted action or indivisible harm notions, a blanket
application of article 2324 creates a windfall to certain tortfeasors. These
injurers, by virtue of their actions and the type of damages inflicted,
owe one hundred percent recovery to the victim. Provided the courts
accept article 2324 as a solidary liability limitation, it should not apply
in situations where tortfeasors cause injuries by independent legal causes,
producing damages that are literally impossible to apportion.
This exclusion does not include situations where the damages are
merely difficult to divide among the parties. Mere fortuity that one
negligent actor made an initial injury more egregious is insufficient to
meet this exception. Additionally, indivisible injury would not be an
appropriate test, since tort damages generally include personal injury
and division of those injuries has proven impracticable. The exception
should only apply when either actor's conduct would have caused the
entire damage.
An example of an independent legal cause is that of two fires which
cause damage. Suppose A and B, independently of one another, set fire
to a forest. The conflagration destroys P's property, situated equidistant
between the two fires; either fire alone would have caused the same
total loss to P. Since the jury, under present civil procedure, cannot
assess one hundred percent fault to A and B each, A and B would
each be fifty percent at fault. Remaining within the literal text of article
2324, A could satisfy his obligation by paying fifty percent of the
damages, leaving P without recourse if B is insolvent. The courts should
prevent such a scenario by carving out a well delineated exception to
article 2324's limited solidary liability.
The underlying question is whether the judiciary possesses the au-
thority to carve out such an exception. The late Justice Albert Tate
would answer in the affirmative.
[A] threshold problem is the consideration of whether the leg-
islature intended the precept in question to be an immutable
rule to be applied without variation or exception ... no matter
how inequitable the result. 193
Alternatives to the immutable rule are that the precept is in the nature
of a standard, allowing some discretion to attain the general aim of
the legislation, or the precept is meant to establish a principal "some-
where between the immutable rule and the general standard." 194 Judges
193. Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev. 727,
731-32, (1962).
194. Id. at 732.
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are not "superlegislators"; rather they should decide the case in a spirit
of cooperation.195
Former Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Barham agrees with this
view. 196 The "science for legislators' '1 97 does not resemble the science
for judges. The legislature creates rules for the common good, while
the judge places these into operation through "wise and reasoned ap-
plication."'19 A judge must accept the fact that there is no express
legislative will dispositive of every case and must discard the "fiction
that judges do not make the law."' 99
The clearest example of a situation beyond the scope. of article
2324's limited solidarity is the two fires hypothetical. A well articulated
definition of concurrent, 200 independent legal cause could provide the
basis for the exception. Any tortfeasor who causes damage by a con-
current, independent legal cause would be a solidary debtor without
consideration of article 2324(B)'s limitation. When tortfeasors acting
contemporaneously, yet not in concert, have a sufficient connexity to
the damage to constitute a legal cause, 20 ' and the damages are sub-
stantially identical in kind despite the other tortfeasor's acts, the victim
should be entitled to full compensation from any tortfeasor. This is so
regardless of any circumstance, particularly insolvency.
Another classical example illustrates the potential scope of this ex-
ception. In Summers v. Tice, 202 a gun shot victim sued two hunters for
his eye injury. Both hunters had negligently shot in Summers' direction,
but only one bullet struck him. The California Supreme Court noted
that in similar cases, courts had held the defendants jointly and severally
liable by straining the acting in concert requirement. The Summers court
asserted that a better analysis would place the burden on each defendant
to absolve himself or face joint and several liability. Unquestionably
195. Id. at 737.
196. See Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 La. L.
Rev. 357 (1973).
197. Id. at 368 n.29.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 369.
200. "Concurrent, as distinguished from joint negligence, arises where the injury is
proximately caused by the concurrent wrongful acts or omissions of two or more persons
acting independently ... [Ulnless the damage caused by each is clearly separable. . .each
is liable for the whole." 1 T. Shearman & A. Redfield, Law of Negligence § 122, at
317 (1913).
201. Louisiana courts have recently moved from an assessment of proximate cause to
legal cause in determining whether an actor's conduct is sufficiently related to the victim's
injury. Both stand for a policy decision whereby particular conduct or omission creates
liability for the actor. But see Pitre v. Opelousas General Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La.
1988) (where Justice Dennis may have signaled a return to proximate cause in an appropriate
circumstance).
202. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
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the injury to Summers is theoretically divisible. One bullet caused the
injury. But as a practical matter, the injury is not divisible.
In this type of situation, the Louisiana courts could accept evidence
from each defendant tending to prove the other tortfeasor's sole re-
sponsibility for the injury. When the injury is literally impossible, not
just difficult, to divide, all tortfeasors should be one hundred percent
solidary obligors. The court should, however, admonish the bench and
bar that the "indivisible injury" and "impossible to apportion" re-
quirements for this exception are not simply metaphors for every personal
injury.
Arguments that this judicial exception creates additional uncertainty
and divergent results are without merit. Intellectual challenges and dif-
ficult decisions are inadequate reasons for denying appropriate relief to
injured parties. Former United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis Pow-
ell recognized the "myriad of definitional tasks performed regularly by
the state and federal courts. ' 20 He met the challenge with adequate
intellect and analysis. Delineating the scope of and determining exceptions
to the law are primary responsibilities of the judiciary. Thoughtless
categorization in the interest of easy application is abhorrent to our
legal system's fundamentals 204 as well as society as a whole.
Alternative Definitions of Joint Tortfeasor
In the event article 2324 finds little application due to one of the
abovementioned reasons such as the "otherwise provided by law" pro-
viso, the judiciary could reconsider the definition and application of
"joint tortfeasors." Every situation where two or more actors cause
injury is an unjust and overly broad application of this term. The
legislature's action is indicative of the dissatisfaction. The courts could
redefine joint torts as something more restrictive than injury to the same
victim caused by two or more tortfeasors. Joint torts could include
situations where: 1) two or more persons fail to perform a common
duty; or 2) the actors cooperate or conspire; 3) the actors cause damage
by concurrent, independent legal cause; 20 5 or 4) neither tortfeasor's ac-
tions produce injury but the combination of the actions creates dam-
ages.
206
The courts could handle vicarious liability in an employer-employee
setting outside a joint tort definition. Recently, the first circuit stated
203. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 683 n.7, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2662
n.7 (1982).
204. This applies to justices, judges, legal scholars, legislators and attorneys alike.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 192-204.
206. See Sadler v. Great Western Ry. Co., (1896) A.C. 450 (Each defendant's actions
alone produced no injury. The court denied joint suit at the time; a result most assuredly
contrary to contemporary law.)
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correctly that "it is legally impossible for an employer and third party
to be joint tortfeasors."207 A suggested analysis would be that article
2315 creates the employee's liability while article 2320 places a similar
onus on the employer. °8 A victim needs no other form of recovery.
Even the nineteenth century courts of England drew this distinction when
allowing joinder of the master and servant. 209 With these guidelines in
place, the pressure from those desiring change may subside.
PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 2324(B)
Pecking Order of Laws20
The 1987 amendment presents another theoretical problem. Two
possible chains of analysis provide the bases for delictual solidary lia-
bility. One rationale uses the obligations articles and the broad judicial
pronouncements of tort solidarity as a foundation.2 " ' The other would
consider article 2324 the more specific rule of law, thus prevailing over
more general provisions.
Under the first view, when two obligors are "liable for the whole
performance, ' 21 2 solidarity arises. This requirement actually begs the
question because whether each actor owes the whole is a question of
policy. 2 a Inasmuch as the fact finder assesses each tortfeasor's fault
individually, no express codal authority requires that each obligor pay
more than his proportionate share. Be that as it may, once the obligor
is arguably liable for the whole, the courts may have used article 2324
to refine solidary liability in a delictual setting. Since both the judicial
pronouncements of solidarity and article 2324 before the 1987 amendment
engendered pure solidarity, the need to distinguish the seminal authority
was unnecessary. The analysis would start with the more general articles
207. See Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc., 536 So. 2d 504, 516 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1988), writs denied, 537 So. 2d 212 and 537 So. 2d 213 (1989).
208. Arguably, the employer and employee should be solidary obligors to give the
victim the benefit of solidarity's effects. Consider the injured party who sues an employee/
tortfeasor one day before prescription runs and is unable to determine the appropriate
employer. Given the status of contemporary corporate structures, suitable discovery to
ascertain all potential employers might encompass several months while the victim's claim
would have prescribed.
209. Wilson v. Tumman, (1843) 6 M. & G. 236, 134 Eng. Rep. 879.
210. Any law student fortunate enough to satisfactorily complete Admiralty at L.S.U.
is well aware of this neologism's author.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 163-70.
212. La. Civ. Code art. 1794.
213. The policies in question are well enunciated in Narcisse v. Illinois Central Ry.,




leading up to specific treatment for delictual damage enunciated in article
2324.
This first view is consistent with a broad definition of solidarity for
application of the secondary benefits of prescription and venue yet restrict
the application related to "deep pocket" defendants' payment of greater
than fifty percent of the damages. The courts could interpret article
2324 as now applicable to the insolvency payment issue only. Provided
the issue was interruption of prescription or proper venue, article 2324
would be inapposite.
Pursuant to this analysis, the courts could hold that the legislature
changed nothing. Since tortfeasors who are liable for the whole under
the earlier case law are solidary obligors as a "matter of law," the
amendment to article 2324 restricts some unknown, undefined and pos-
sibly nonexistent type of solidary liability in tort. Put differently, article
2324 does nothing. This is a highly unlikely interpretation.
Under the second view, article 2324 is the fundamental delictual
solidarity law inasmuch as it states unequivocally that when two or
more cause damage solidarity is created. Article 1794, its predecessor,
and the jurisprudence interpreting both articles could be inapplicable in
a delictual setting. In this case, the fifty percent limitation would come
to bear. The application of article 2324 would be universal in delictual
settings.
This dichotomy represents the proverbial "chicken or the egg" di-
lemma. Whether the analysis begins with article 1794 or 2324 is generally
a matter for the courts-a pecking order of laws problem. One must
consider societal policies of victim compensation, loss allocation, and
deterrence. Absent express legislation, the judiciary should require ad-
ditional indicia of the necessity to modify solidarity before broadly
construing article 2324 and placing the insolvency risk upon victims for
the first time in Louisiana's legal history. The fact that some states
have limited joint and several liability does not justify wholesale aban-
donment of solidary liability by Louisiana.
The Collection Costs Issue
Once the court attributes fault to the litigants,2 1 4 article 2324 fails
to provide a mechanism for determining who bears the recovery costs.
Each defendant will insist that all other defendants are solvent for their
portion of the damages up to a fifty percent recovery for the victim,
while victims will maintain that at least one defendant must tender fifty
percent of the judgment. Either the victim or the solvent tortfeasor




shoulders the expense and delay of forcing payment from the marginally
or actually insolvent injurer. This dispute will generate additional at-
torney fees, court costs, and possibly forgone interest during the ad-
ditional delay. 215
Assume for example defendant A is seventy percent at fault, B is
thirty percent at fault and A's net worth is relatively equal to his portion
of the damages. When B satisfies his thirty percent, he could insist that
the remaining damages are recoverable, although expensive to collect,
thus creating a joint, divisible obligation that relieves B of further
liability. The victim must then institute proceedings to extract A's limited
resources. Alternatively, the courts could require that B pay fifty percent,
then struggle with the victim for his contribution remedy. Under the
latter scenario, B's priority also becomes an issue-whether he stands
subordinated to the victim's claim or shares on some proportionate basis
in recovery from A.
Tortfeasors should bear these recovery costs. The court's could draw
an analogy to a principle of Louisiana's Direct Action Statute, which
provides that a judgment against the insured is prima facie evidence of
the insured's insolvency. 21 6 Applying a similar evidentiary standard to
the judgment against each tortfeasor, the burden would shift to a solvent
defendant with less than fifty percent fault to prove the collectibility of
at least fifty percent of the damages, which could include his portion.
If the solvent defendant fails to produce further evidence of the other
defendant's financial wealth, the victim prevails on the issue of solidary
liability against the solvent defendant up to fifty percent of the damages.
In all cases of one solvent defendant with greater fault than the victim,
the injured party could recover fifty percent of his damages with little
additional expense.
A solvent defendant's best argument lies in the fact that if only
one insolvent defendant existed, the victim would bear all of the col-
lection costs. The victim receives a windfall when imposing these costs
on a defendant in a situation where there are two or more injurers.
215. Assuming the tortfeasor's wealth is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the victim
cannot recover any additional sums such as judicial interest.
216. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978) states in pertinent part:
No policy or contract of liability insurance shall be issued or delivered in this
state, unless it contains provisions to the effect that the insolvency or bankruptcy
of the insured shall not release the insurer from the payment of damages for
injuries sustained or loss occasioned during the existence of the policy, and any
judgment which may be rendered against the insured for which the insurer is
liable which shall have become executory, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of the insolvency of the insured, and an action may thereafter be maintained




This argument is weakened when considering that underlying the principle
of solidary liability is a policy of victim's compensation, at least up to
fifty percent from any joint tortfeasor, not a policy of absolute fairness
to a coinjurer. Since the legislature limited solidary liability to fifty
percent, the judiciary should not further reduce the victim's recovery
by placing these collection costs upon the victim.
Several alternatives exist for the solvent defendant to fulfill his
obligation. In situations similar to the example above where the solvent
defendant pays fifty percent of the damages, 21 7 that defendant would
then assess the feasibility of recovery from any codefendant and take
appropriate action. To recover sums above the fifty percent, the victim
would bear the additional collection expense. This produces a dilemma
because the victim and solvent defendant will struggle over a limited,
possibly inadequate source of funds, thus probably exacerbating the
collection expense and delay. A second option is to require the victim
to institute reasonable collection procedures. This is probably best han-
dled on a legislative basis to eliminate the partial coverage of judge-
made laws related to administrative matters. 21s The legislature could
define these procedures and allow recovery from the solvent tortfeasor
upon the victim's fulfilling that statutory duty. In this scenario, both
parties share a portion of the costs. Finally, the courts could establish
a maximum collection period before the victim could compel the solvent
defendant to pay more than its fault up to fifty percent. A one-year
period is appropriate. The delay is an expense of the victim, provided
interest stops accruing. 2 9 Additionally, the possibility that the insolvent
defendant's financial posture might worsen creates an incentive for the
solvent defendant to assist in the collection process even before the one-
year period accrues.
The Employer/Tortfeasor/Intervenor/Defendant
In light of article 2324(B)'s amendment, the views enunciated in
Franklin v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers20 require reassessment. 22' There, the
217. With more than one solvent defendant, any combination creating the 50 percent
threshold would suffice.
218. But see In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1988) (where Justice Dennis had
little hesitancy announcing administrative procedures related to private adoptions).
219. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act espouses a similar approach. Up to one
year after judgment, the court, upon motion of a party, "shall determine whether [a
tortfeasor's] obligation is collectible [and] shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among
the other parties, including a claimant at fault."
220. 478 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writs denied, 481 So. 2d 1331 (1986).
221. See the writ denial concurrance in Snyder v. Taylor, 532 So. 2d 750 (La. 1988)
(where Justice Lemmon flatly disagreed with Franklin even though the issue was not
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third circuit held that an employer's negligence is not imputed to the
employee in the latter's suit against third party tortfeasors. Additionally,
the employer was allowed to recover one hundred percent of the worker's
compensation benefits paid regardless of its fault. 22
Assuming the courts apply the fifty percent limitation in article 2324
in an employer/employee/third party tortfeasor setting, the employer's
fault is relevant and the trier of fact must assess it. The initial inquiry
is whether the employer's fault reduces recoverable damages thereby
reducing the fifty percent solidary liability cap of the other tortfeasors.
When deciding not to reduce the employee's recovery by the employer's
negligence, the Franklin court reasoned that the non-employer defendants
were solidary obligors for the entire damage. Such a rationale no longer
exists if the fifty percent limitation applies. Moreover, Franklin speaks
of an erosion in the system2 3 when the employer's fault reduces the
employee's recovery. Reducing recoverable damages in this situation
causes similar deterioration. No reason exists to extend workers' com-
pensation protection to third party tortfeasors by reducing recoverable
damages and the concomitant result of reduced solidarity below fifty
percent of the total damages. The amendment to article 2324 changed
none of these policy choices. With the advent of fifty percent solidarity,
the court must reaffirm Franklin's holding on different grounds or reduce
the employee's recovery based upon the employer's fault.
To assess the choices, assume that XYZ Company injures plaintiff
P, its employee, in conjunction with two other tortfeasors. XYZ pays
$15,000 in compensation benefits. The damages are $100,000, XYZ is
forty percent at fault, B is forty percent at fault, and C is twenty
percent at fault. B is insolvent.
present in the underlying matter). See also Williams v. American Crescent Elevator Co.,
518 So. 2d 1091, 1096 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writs denied, 521 So. 2d 1189 and 521
So. 2d 1190 (1988) (where Judge Williams, in dissent, noted further "confusion and
inequity" may result in situations factually similar to Franklin absent legislative clarification
related to article 2324).
222. The fourth circuit recently restated Franklin's teachings in Senez v. Grumman
Flexible Corp., 518 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1151
(1988), and affirmed the trial judge's rejection of jury interrogatories related to the
employer's negligence. "There was no legal basis" for "submission of the [employer's
negligence] to the jury," and the compensation carrier recovered one hundred percent of
the paid benefits. Id. at 577. But see Trosclair v. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 489 So.
2d 1293 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 647 (1986) (where the first circuit
reduced the compensation intervention by the employer's fault but not the employer's
fault) and Thompson v. Petrounited Terminals, Inc. 536 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 212 (1989) (where the court reversed the trial court's
reduction of the employee's recovery by the employer's fault).
223. Franklin, 478 So. 2d at 557.
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Percentage of Availability for
Party Fault Collection
B 40 insolvent
C 20 deep pocket
XYZ 40 employer
The threshold inquiry is whether XYZ negligence reduces the $100,000
damage award regardless of B's financial status. Notwithstanding the
fact that B and C are only solidary debtors for fifty percent of the
damages, the Franklin policies remain germane. Under that court's view,
"[the] Worker's Compensation system is characterized as a compromise
between employer and employee, ' 24 the principles of which "can be
fully effectuated only if the employer is given absolute immunity at all
levels." ' 22' Reduction of the employee's recovery by the employer's neg-
ligence "erodes the system. 22 6 The compensation system struck a balance
between workers and employers, and this reduction upsets the initial
tradeoff. The amendment to article 2324 has no effect on these policies,
particularly if B and C are solvent. P should recover one hundred
percent of his damages and owe $15,000 to XYZ on the compensation
intervention.127
If the employer's fault is judged to reduce recoverable damages
when determining the limit of solidarity, then C is solidarily liable for
fifty percent of sixty percent of the damages, or $30,000. This represents
a marked departure from the Franklin recovery. A better approach
disregards the employer's fault for purposes of the fifty percent limi-
tation. The remaining tortfeasors would owe a solidary obligation for
fifty percent of the damages and would apportion the obligations by
their relative faults. As posited, C would owe a $50,000 solidary ob-
ligation and would be entitled to contribution from B by computing
C's virile share of the total damages based upon B and C's relative
faults. This amounts to a $16,667228 contribution from B. The same
basic policies of Franklin are at stake. The reduction in an employee's
damages by the employer's fault runs afoul with the employer's absolute
224. Id. at 556.
225. Id. at 557.
226. Id.
227. Subject to the employer's obligation to pay Moody attorney fees. See Moody v.
Arabie, 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986).
228.
C's fault 20%
X $100,000 ------- x $100,000 = $33,333
B's fault + C's fault 60%
$50,000 paid - $33,000 virile share = $16,667 contribution owed from B.
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immunity and the compensation "bargain." Even when deciding Frank-
lin, the court could have reduced the victim's recovery by the employer's
fault without disrupting any solidary liability principles. For example,
the employer's fault could be outside the scope of the third party
tortfeasor's duty. The court chose instead not to reduce the employee's
recovery, and the rationale for holding the tortfeasors one hundred
percent liable remains apposite regardless of the amendment to article
2324.
Whether XYZ's negligence reduces its compensation recovery presents
another question of policy. When an employee recovered one hundred
percent under the rule of Franklin and pure solidary liability, the em-
ployer's compensation reimbursement eliminated the employee's double
recovery for the losses covered by compensation. The law loathes double
recovery,2 9 a principle that overrides the arguable unfairness of allowing
an employer's one hundred percent recovery of paid compensation not-
withstanding some degree of fault. This amendment presents a rule of
law that probably eliminates any chance of double recovery when one
tortfeasor is insolvent. The solvent tortfeasor would owe only fifty
percent of "recoverable" damages, whatever that includes.
Before the amendment, tortfeasors bore the risk that the employer
was at fault. Victims recovered one hundred percent of their damages
regardless of its employer's fault. Presently, due to limited solidarity,
an employee may recover only a portion of his loss and then possibly
owe reimbursement from that limited recovery. The judiciary might
consider withholding the employer's compensation reimbursement until
the employee recovers one hundred percent from third party tortfeasors,
an outcome similar to the result when all tortfeasors are solvent. The
result then equals that of Franklin; employee recovers one hundred
percent and employer is fully reimbursed.230 As in the above described
example, since B is insolvent, the employer receives no reimbursement,
thereby sharing a portion of the employee's insolvency loss. P recovers
$65,000, $15,000 from XYZ and $50,000 from C. 231 At first blush, it
may appear inequitable to eliminate XYZ's reimbursement, but even
with such a rule P suffers a $35,000232 insolvency loss while the em-
229. The collateral source rule excepted.
230. See supra note 227.
231. $100,000 x 50% = $50,000
232.
$100,000 damage award
- 50,000 from C
$50,000




ployer's costs are $15,000. Certainly the employee deserves protection
from further reduced recovery. Without this bright line rule of non-
reimbursement, the judiciary would be required to fashion a formula
balancing the employer's reimbursement against an already reduced em-
ployee recovery.
At what point would the employer receive reimbursement and would
the reimbursement be proportionate or in toto? Consider the situation
above but where B is only partially insolvent and can pay $35,000. P
is now fully compensated-$15,000 from XYZ, Inc. $35,000 from B
and $50,000 from C. Should XYZ receive reimbursement? In accordance
with Franklin's teachings, the answer should be no. Any refund by P
reduces his recovery causing P to suffer the insolvency loss. The victim
would pay the compensation benefits as reimbursement while, as in this
situation, the employer who was at fault, would pay nothing. If article
2324 reduces solidary liability to fifty percent, and an employer is at
fault, then, by definition, an employee-victim can rarely recover more
than one hundred percent of the damages as was possible when Franklin
was decided. Only if the compensation benefits exceed the employer's
virile share of the damages and other tortfeasors are all solvent could
this situation develop. In that case, the courts should allow reimburse-
ment to the employer for the compensation benefits to the extent they
exceed the victim's complete recovery. 2
33
An alternative solution to the problem would disregard the em-
ployer's fault once assessed and hold the remaining tortfeasors liable in
the proportion that their respective faults bear to the remaining fault.
Suppose XYZ injures plaintiff P, its employee, in conjunction with two
other tortfeasors. XYZ pays $15,000 in compensation benefits, and the
damages are $100,000. XYZ is thirty percent at fault, A is thirty percent
at fault and C is forty percent at fault.





Disregarding XYZ's fault, A owes 3/7ths and C owes 4/7ths of the
damages. Provided both are solvent, P recovers $100,000, and XYZ
233. Professor Johnson advocated a similar step by step analysis when determining
whether an employer should receive compensation reimbursement from the employee's




receives a $15,000 compensation benefits reimbursement. The result is
identical to the result under Franklin.
Article 2324's amendment had no effect on the policy that an
employer's fault is immaterial when assessing damages against tortfea-
sors. In fact, the "erosion" will be more pronounced under limited
solidary liability, with its concomitant risk of insolvency loss to the
employee. A similar rationale applies when considering whether to reduce
the employer's compensation reimbursement, but only when an employee
recovers one hundred percent of his damages. 234 Basically, ample jus-
tification exists to disregard the employer's fault, thus insuring the
employee-victim's maximum recovery under the current law while re-
imbursing the employer to the extent double recovery arises.
Solidary Liability and Jury Fault Assessment
Limited solidarity poses an additional risk to victims which the
legislature probably failed to consider. The accuracy of the factfinder's
fault apportionment between the tortfeasors and the victim takes on
considerably more significance. Under the old law, the defendants' fault
assessments affected contribution only and did not form the basis for
a victim's reduced recovery. Since a tortfeasor is potentially solidarily
liable only up to fifty percent in a limited solidarity situation, the victim's
recovery diminishes directly with any error in allocating fault if the
victim is less than fifty percent at fault. The bench and bar must now
remain mindful of the added potential for inequitable results.
The imprecision inherent in the allocation of fault 235 is arguably
exacerbated by adding solidary liability limitations based upon the jury's
fault assessment. Prior to the 1987 amendment to article 2324, com-
parative negligence, as described in Civil Code article 2323, reduced a
victim's recovery by its fault. Notwithstanding that juries made errors,
legal scholars, and eventually legislatures, felt this risk of error was
better than the complete bar to recovery rule that had existed before
the comparative negligence. Formerly errors related to the defendants'
fault apportionment were borne by the tortfeasors, so long as the victim's
fault was not greater than any one injurer. The courts considered these
injurers primarily culpable and equitably obligated for this risk. The
victim recovered one hundred percent, less his comparative fault, while
234. As when no third party tortfeasor is insolvent in a limited solidary liability setting.
235. Professor Green, a noted scholar, was particularly wary of the jury's capability
and eloquently stated his reservations:
What court or group of laymen can so weigh faults as to pass with any precision
upon the conduct of two swiftly moving automobiles, or two human beings
equally bent on getting every second out of the day?
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255, 278 (1929).
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the tortfeasors used contribution principles and the percentages to al-
locate the damages.
Under the present legislation, victims may suffer this margin of error
twice. 23 6 As before, victims bear the risk related to the victim's com-
parative negligence apportionment. But in addition to that risk, victims
now run the risk that the factfinder will misdetermine the tortfeasors'
degree of fault. Since article 2324 might limit a tortfeasor's liability to
fifty percent or its respective fault, 237 misallocation directly reduces the
victim's recovery.
Passive tortfeasor conduct may create additional fault assessment
injustice. 28 Passive conduct is generally associated with parties distant
in time or locus to the actual injury, such as manufacturers. 23 9 The jury
might consider the passive party less culpable, notwithstanding the prod-
uct or thing substantially increased the damages. The judge must be
mindful that the accuracy of a jury's fault assessment is manifestly
more significant in light the possible interpretation of article 2324's
amendment. Passive conduct may appear less culpable, giving a man-
ufacturer an advantage, thus creating the need for increased intervention
by the bench in the form of Judgments Notwithstanding the Verdict to
correct the error. 240
236. Admittedly, the risk of error cuts both ways.
237. If the tortfeasor's fault is greater than 50 percent and another injurer caused a
portion of the damage.
238. The active-passive negligence distinction is predicated on the principles governing
primary-secondary liability generally. Active negligence is the negligent conduct of active
operations. It involves some positive act or some breach of duty to act which is the
equivalent of a positive act ... In contrast, passive negligence is nonfeasance or inaction,
such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty imposed by
law. However, a negligent failure to act when one is charged with a duty to do so is
active rather than passive negligence. The difference is qualitative rather than quantitative.
Sweeny v. Pease, 294 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 1980); See also Colt Indus. Operating Corp.
v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 272 S.E.2d 251 (1980); Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. United
States Equip. Co., 624 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying Michigan law.)
239. Consider again the hypothetical presented in the introduction, where plaintiff P
is severely burned in an otherwise minor automobile accident. Due to the passive tort-
feasor's negligent construction, the damages are greatly exacerbated. A similar situation
might develop with a strictly liable defendant who is liable due to his legal relationship,
not conduct.
240. Full disclosure to the jury can ameliorate this risk. It is "better for courts to
be the vehicle by which the operation of the law is explained," H. Woods, Comparative
Fault § 18:2, at 367 (1978) (quoting Simpson v. Anderson, 33 Colo. App. 134, 517 P.2d
416 (1973), rev'd., 186 Colo. 163, 526 P.2d 298 (1974), than "keep the jury in the dark
as to the [legal] effect of its answers" with the concomitant "danger that [jurors] will
guess wrong about the law." They "may shape [their] answer[s] to the special verdicts,
contrary to [their] actual beliefs . . . to ensure the result ... deem[ed] desirable." 9 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2509, at 513 (1971). The author's
assertion later acquired acceptance. See H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 18:2, at 422 (2d
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THE UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act24 presents a reasonable leg-
islative alternative. The legislature could repeal article 2324 as it presently
exists, adopting the more moderate view of the uniform law. Provided
the victim is faultless, the uniform law maintains pure joint and several
liability. Only tortfeasors bear the risk of another injurer's insolvency;
the innocent victim recovers one hundred percent. As between the victim
and solvent injurer, the culpable party who exacerbated the damage
deserves less protection. 242
Alternatively, the victim with comparative fault bears a proportionate
share of any insolvency. Suppose A and B injure plaintiff P. The
damages are $100,000; P is ten percent at fault; defendant B is seventy
percent at fault; C is twenty percent at fault; B is insolvent.





B's "obligation is uncollectible" by virtue of his insolvency therefore
"the court ... shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the
other parties, including a claimant at fault." 243 P recovers from C two-
thirds of the damages apportioned to B, or $46,667, and bears one-
third of the loss due to its comparative negligence. 244 Again, one's sense
of fairness agrees with sharing the loss when the victim is partially
blameworthy. 24
ed. 1987) (where the author stated that "there is now a decided statutory and decisional
trend "to inform the jury of its answer's effect). See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S. Ct. 755 (1979) (where the federal courts inform the jury
that an F.E.L.A. damage award is tax free to prevent the jury from utilizing its own
knowledge of Federal taxation and overcompensating the injured party).
241. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 2(c) & (d), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1989).
242. Most writers agree. See Ambriz v. Kress, 148 Cal. App. 3d 963, 969 n.4, 196
Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 n.4 (1983).
243. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 2(d), 2 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1989).
244.
C's fault damage 20%
X ------- x $ 70,000 = $46,667
P's fault + C's fault apportioned to B 30%
245. See, e.g., Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique
and Amplification of American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, 14 Loy. L.A.L. Rev.
775, 817 (1980) and Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 239, 251 (1976).
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SECTION C OF ARTICLE 2324
The addition of section C of article 2324 in 1988 addressed the
consequences of limited solidary liability and prescription that the 1987
amendment omitted. Since suit against one solidary obligor interrupts
prescription against all other solidary obligors, 246 a gap in the law existed
regarding the effect of limited solidarity on the interruption of pre-
scription. For example, suppose P sues A within one year 247 of the date
of injury, but fails to bring suit against B until after one year. Under
the old law, the solidary nature of A and B's obligation would interrupt
prescription on P's claim against B. Assuming article 2324's ambiguities
are resolved in favor of solvent defendants, and if P can recover fifty
percent of his damages from A, A and B's obligation is joint and
divisible. B could successfully assert an exception of prescription because
of untimely suit against him and P's inability to avail himself of in-
terruption via a solidary obligor. Whether P recovers fifty percent is
determinable only after trial; the court could require B remain in the
litigation until its conclusion to determine whether B was a solidary
obligor.
Section C purports to correct this situation. Even though the leg-
islature corrected the prescription problems, a window exists from the
September 1, 1987 effective date to the 1988 acts where the enumerated
problems are certain to arise. 248 The 1988 amendment represents a work-
able solution and should guide the judiciary when dealing with those
cases arising within this four day period.
CONCLUSION
When ferreting out a reasonable interpretation of article 2324, the
judiciary should consider the various policies at stake and alternatives
available. Knowledge of other tested systems can provide a basis for a
workable solution. At the same time, the legislature may be dissatisfied
with unlimited solidary liability and seek again to modify the article's
content, particularly if the judiciary disregards the implicit message in
the amendment to article 2324.
United States Supreme Court Justice Stewart accurately described
the interpretive problems associated with article 2324's amendment when
stating that "[mlore than a dictionary is thus required to understand
the provision here involved, and no appeal to the 'plain language' of
the section can obviate the need for further statutory construction. ' 249
246. La. Civ. Code arts. 1799 & 3503.
247. This assumes a one year delictual prescriptive period. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
248. One author has suggested that this "gap" lasted only four days. See Schewe and
Theriot, Developments in the Law, 49 La. L. Rev. 463 (1989).
249. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 445, 448 n.16 (1967).
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Perhaps, the single most problematic aspect of article 2324's amendment
is the "as otherwise provided by law" exception. Since the Legislature
struck down the original version without this proviso, one must con-
template what swayed legislators who changed their vote. It is quite
probable that this "swing vote" intended that the legislation have little
or no effect. Realizing that "as otherwise provided by law" included
every situation previously adjudicated, the legislators decided to support
the amendment realizing nothing would change.
Alternatively, the structure and terminology affords the judiciary
great latitude in the application of limited solidary liability. Recoverable
damages should include one hundred percent of the sum necessary to
compensate the victim based on traditional tort principles of recovery
for out of pocket expenditures and losses with guestimations for the
future elements. Regardless of a tortfeasor's insolvency or the injured
party's comparative fault, the sum of damages should equal one hundred
percent. The arguable proposition that the phrase "liability for damages
caused by two or more persons shall be solidary" extends the application
of solidary liability should be disregarded. The underpinnings of current
political pressures to modify solidarity stems, in part, from the unres-
tricted application of solidary liability. Courts must reassess the basic
competing policies formulating a rule of law consistent with the need
to hold parties liable for their joint work.
When interpreting article 2324, courts must remain mindful of the
logical extensions associated with each decision. Ingenious attorneys will
manipulate the initial decision interpreting article 2324(B), possibly steer-
ing the development of limited solidary liability off course.
Injurers should bear the collection costs which are possible in a
limited solidarity setting. The worst case scenario for victims is that the
legislature intended a fifty percent across the board limitation on solidary
liability; further reduction in recovery is unwarranted. Additionally, the
jury's fault assessment takes on increased significance. Procedural de-
vices, such as motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
for new trial, exist to rectify any errors.
The courts must reconsider Franklin v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers.250
Between the employer, employee and third party tortfeasor, the balance
shifts against the employee if article 2324 limits the employee's recovery.
Even though the facts of a case may be such that the employee recovers
one hundred percent of the damages, the court must carefully structure
its opinion to avoid prejudicing a subsequent employee with less favorable
circumstances.
Provided article 2324 limits solidary liability, a jurisprudential ex-
clusion is necessary in an appropriate situation. When two or more
250. 478 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), writs denied, 481 So. 2d 1331 (1986).
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actors cause damage independently of one another, the courts should
then apply traditional one hundred percent solidarity. Without question,
authority exists to carve out such an exclusion. In the event article 2324
changes nothing, the courts must consider restricting the application of
solidarity. Historically, as exhibited, the judiciary and legal scholars
limited solidary liability to specific joint conduct. Their rationale could
again provide the basis for a more moderate position on the issue.
The legislature should consider clarifying article 2324 or, better yet,
adopting some form of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.", Since
the uniform law espouses limited solidary liability only where the victim
is also at fault, it may provide a palatable solution that is acceptable
to both sides of the tort reform movement.
In closing consider two not so fictional societies: one where deep
pocket defendants, such as state governments and insurance companies,
are solidary obligors for one hundred percent of the loss regardless of
their fault and a second where tortfeasors pay damages for their re-
spective faults only. In both settings, the bureaucracy rarely responds
promptly to its constituent's problems. Additionally, insurers recognize
the advantage of periodic inspections of their insureds to minimize
liability exposure. As the state's highways, bridges and basic infrastruc-
ture deteriorate while budgets remain tight and profit margins critical,
each society must allocate its scarce resources among competing projects.
The officials and businessmen of both societies continuously assess the
cost/benefit analysis. The limited solidarity of the latter society, however,
creates an incentive to expend fewer sums correcting risk creating ac-
tivities and conditions. Solidary liability thus possibly provides a nec-
essary impetus to those controlling the efficient use of resources. In
light of human nature and one's experiences, one of these societies poses
a safer place to work, travel the countryside, send our children to school
and generally enjoy life to its fullest.
M. Kevin Queenan
251. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 2(c) & (d), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1989).
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